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Abstract

The year 1576 was tumultuous for the settlement of Santa Elena. Ten years had
passed since the town’s founding, and not all of its residents were content with the
colony’s state of affairs. In the fall of 1576, the Crown’s appointed investigator, Baltasar
del Castillo y Ahedo, began a lengthy investigation of the tenures of Santa Elena’s royal
officials. The timing and significance of these reviews was crucial as they were
performed shortly after Santa Elena’s temporary abandonment in June of 1576. Castillo, a
former accountant in Pedro Menéndez de Avilés’s royal armada, revealed how Santa
Elena’s officials systematically abused Florida’s royal subsidy for personal gain. Florida
was a region notorious for financial ruin yet it still held immense symbolic importance.
After fifty years of failed colonization attempts, the Crown relied on the private
entrepreneurship of Pedro Menéndez and his comuño, or kinship network, to colonize
Florida. Castillo’s investigation, however, reveals that despite lucrative incentives,
private entrepreneurship did not work to expand Spain’s empire into North America.
Instead, royal officials remained on the coast where they could safely profit from
guaranteed royal subsidies.

1

Chapter One: Introduction

In December of 1575, the Spanish Crown appointed Baltasar del Castillo y
Ahedo, a former accountant of the Royal Armada, to conduct an investigation of Santa
Elena’s highest-ranking officials. The persons under Castillo’s scrutiny were Florida’s
adelantado1 Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the colony’s royal officials, collectively
referred to as the comuño, or kin, of Pedro Menéndez.2 Before Castillo could reach his
destination, however, Santa Elena’s residents abandoned the small, peripheral settlement,
located on what is today Parris Island, South Carolina.3 The evacuation of Santa Elena
made Castillo’s investigation all the more pressing, as abandoning a royal colony
jeopardized Spanish hegemony.4 When Castillo finally arrived in Florida in November of
1576, he questioned previous residents as to what transpired in Santa Elena. Each witness
recounted that an Indian siege descended upon the settlement, forcing the colonists to
flee. Though Castillo was interested in learning more about the event, he was more so

1

Historian Eugene Lyon defines adelantado as, “A Spanish or Spanish colonial official, appointed to
represent the King’s interest in frontier areas in return for grants of authority and certain revenues and
exemptions, as stipulated in the contract or articles of appointment.” By extension, the district that an
adelantado controlled was referred to as their adelantamiento. See Eugene Lyon, The Enterprise of
Florida: Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the Spanish Conquest of 1565-1568 (Gainesville: University Press
of Florida, 1976), 229.
2
I will speak about the comuño at length in coming pages.
3
By 1576, Santa Elena had a settlement population of approximately three hundred residents, soldiers and
colonists included. The residents of Santa Elena fled the area in June of 1576 due to an Indian siege that
descended upon the town and garrison. Evacuees found sanctuary in places like St. Augustine, Havana, and
even New Spain. See J. Michael Francis and Kathleen M. Kole, Murder and Martyrdom in Spanish
Florida: Don Juan and the Guale Uprising of 1597 (New York: American Museum of Natural History,
2011), 23-5.
4
Colonists evacuated in June of 1576.
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concerned with how royal officials governed Santa Elena before its temporary
dissolution. Irritated by increasing reports of poverty, hardship, and royal malfeasance,
the Spanish Crown sent Castillo to uncover exactly what was happening in the distant
colony.

Figure 1.1 Sixteenth-century Santa Elena and St. Augustine5

5

Chester B. DePratter and Stanley South, "Discovery at Santa Elena: Boundary Survey" Research
Manuscript Series Book 223, 1995, 3.

3
For two years, Castillo questioned witnesses and collected evidence, which helped
him judge the tenures of Santa Elena’s royal officials. Castillo’s forty-four-question
visita, or interrogatory, helped to guide witnesses’ grievances. His queries touched upon
ecclesiastical and secular matters, however it is evident that Castillo, and by extension the
Spanish Crown, was most interested in the colony’s fiscal management. Conducting the
investigation from St. Augustine and Havana, Santa Elena’s closest, neighboring
settlements, Castillo listened as disgruntled settlers and soldiers recounted royal officials’
treatment of them, their families, the management of local affairs and, in particular, the
direction of the local economy. Castillo compiled, copied, weighed judgment, and
ultimately forwarded his report to the Council of the Indies. In over 3,100 pages of
witness testimonies, defense pleas, autos (decrees), supply inventories, property lists, and
criminal charges, the results of Castillo’s residencia indeed fulfilled the Crown’s desire
to expose and punish fiscal malfeasance.
Few scholars have used the contents of Castillo’s investigation to inform their
perceptions of sixteenth-century Florida; even fewer have pointedly considered the
consequences of his monumental review. Most recently, historians J. Michael Francis and
Kathleen M. Kole have employed Castillo’s review in Murder and Martyrdom in Spanish
Florida: Don Juan and the Guale Uprising of 1597 to inform their discussion of Spanish
and Indian relations at the close of the sixteenth-century. In her Ph.D. dissertation, “To
Settle is to Conquer: Spaniards, Indians, and the Sixteenth-Century Colonization of Santa
Elena,” historian Karen Paar culls extensively from Castillo’s investigation to discuss the
experiences of Spaniards and Indians throughout Santa Elena’s cumulative, twenty-one
year existence (1566-87). Further highlighting the multifaceted nature of the document,
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Paar also uses Castillo’s review to explore notions of honor as well as the roles of
Indigenous and European women in the settlement.6 Historian Paul Hoffman briefly cites
Castillo’s visit in Florida’s Frontiers, however he does not analyze its significance.7
To date, historians Eugene Lyon and Amy Bushnell have given the most attention
to Castillo’s investigation. In her study of Spanish Florida’s royal treasury, Bushnell
notes the 1576 arrival of Castillo in Florida and the reason for his royal visitation: “…to
visit the forts in Florida, inspect the artillery and report on the governors and officials.”8
Bushnell suggests that Florida’s confusing treasury practices as well as the controversy
that Castillo stepped into over the deceased adelantado’s estate left the investigator
bewildered.9 Reinforcing this portrayal, Bushnell includes a brief moment of reflection
from Castillo in regards to his time spent investigating Santa Elena’s royal officials: “In
Florida I did not find, nor was there ever, an account which was clear.”10 Bushnell
concludes her treatment of Castillo’s investigation by arguing the consequences of his
report: that the Crown instated regular administration, as opposed to the comuño’s
patrimonial administration, of Florida’s accounts, which entailed yearly audits of the
royal coffers from 1577 forward.11
Including Castillo’s remark, however, disputes Bushnell’s observation made only
one page prior. Before Castillo’s landing in Florida, Bushnell recounts how Castillo had
previously served as an accountant for the Royal Armada, then under the command of
Adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. She states that Castillo’s “services were cheap,
6

Karen Paar, “To Settle is to Conquer: Spaniards, Indians, and the Sixteenth-Century Colonization of Santa
Elena,” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill, 1999).
7
Paul Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 67-8.
8
Bushnell, The King’s Coffer, Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702 (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1981), 122.
9
Pedro Menéndez died in September of 1574.
10
Bushnell, The King’s Coffer, 123.
11
Ibid.

5
for the reason that he, too, was under sentence of perpetual exile and loss of office, for
trafficking as an armada official.”12
Castillo’s supposed confusion over Menéndez’s affairs and his previous
appointment as accountant of the Armada contradict one another. The affairs of the
Florida Enterprise and the Indies Fleet were tightly intertwined under Menéndez’s
direction. Under the adelantado’s orders, ships in the fleet catered to Florida. Castillo
expressed the lack of clarity in Florida’s accounts, but evidence explicitly shows that he
knew more. Castillo’s knowledge of Menéndez and the comuño’s affairs are obvious
throughout his visita questions. In some cases, the evidence is stark, as Castillo
practically guides witnesses in queries concerning commercial shipping and treasury
practices. For example, question thirty-nine asks,
“Do you know about the purchases made by royal officials both in the provinces
and outside of them of provisions, weapons, and ammunition or any other things that may
have been fraudulently charged against the royal treasury of Your Majesty, whether they
were placed at excessive prices or bartered for merchandise that allowed them to profit in
the form of treasury withdrawals?”13
Additionally, the list of criminal charges drawn by Castillo highlights his
familiarity with the comuño’s operations. For example, charges against the adelantado
and comuño members included details about illicit trafficking, especially of Florida’s
situado, or royal subsidy, throughout the Caribbean as well as using trade surrogates to
sell provisions in Florida at inflated prices, in some instances at a 200% increase.

12

Ibid, 122.
AGI Escribania 154A, “Visita que Baltasar Castillo tomo al adelantado Menéndez y a sus tenyentes
officiales,” 1576-77, fol. 120v.
13
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Historian Eugene Lyon elucidates the operations of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés
and the comuño.14 In his chapter titled, “The Visita of 1576 and the Change of
Government in Spanish Florida,” Lyon provides an overarching narrative of the conquest
of Florida, the struggles it continually faced, and ultimately what the Crown’s aims were
when it dispatched Castillo to investigate.15 At the close of Castillo’s appointment, the
Crown gained much needed insight into the operations of Menéndez and the comuño, as
well as the evidence necessary to tighten royal authority in the province. Castillo’s report
revealed to the Crown that the private entrepreneurship of Menendez and the comuño did
not succeed in expanding Spain’s empire into Florida. Instead, they directed their
energies towards profiting from Crown subsidies, which hindered expansion into North
America’s vast interior.
In regards to Castillo himself, Lyon provides a slightly different portrayal of the
man as compared to Bushnell. Lyon states that, “the visitor of 1576 possessed the
personal force, technical knowledge, and even the guile to perform his task well.”16
Castillo charged royal officials of Santa Elena for the crimes they committed because of
his prior knowledge of their affairs. Only one person, however, was seriously
condemned, the adelantado’s son-in-law and interim governor of Santa Elena, don Diego
de Velasco.17 Though unnerved by the actions of its royal officials in Florida, the Crown

14

See also Lyon, The Enterprise of Florida; “Santa Elena: A Brief History of the Colony,” “Neglected
Aspect,” Spanish Borderland Sourcebook, “Richer Than we Thought,”
15
Eugene Lyon, ed., Spanish Borderland Sourcebooks: Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1995), 568.
16
Ibid, 572.
17
Velasco was not forced to sit through the entirety of his three-year exile sentence, and in fact was later
promoted to several other high-ranking positions across the Indies, including two governorships: one in
New Biscay and the other in the Yucatan. See John Frederick Schwaller, “Nobility, Family, and Service:
Menéndez and His Men” The Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jan., 1988), 305-06.
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understood that a fine line existed between their punishments and the colony’s very
survival.
Only Lyon and Bushnell considered how Castillo’s background influenced
Florida’s 1576 residencia. What this treatment of Castillo’s investigation seeks to do,
therefore, is assert Castillo as an influential force, whose experiences not only informed
the residencia but also what the residencia revealed about Menéndez and the Florida
Enterprise ten years after its start. Displayed in Pedro Menéndez’s 1565 royal contract to
conquer Florida, the Crown depended on private entrepreneurship to expand the Spanish
Empire into North America. As shown throughout Castillo’s investigation, however, this
approach received negligible success, for colonization did not extend beyond Florida’s
coast. The introduction of Florida’s royal subsidy in 1570 further arrested territorial
expansion. Pedro Menéndez and the comuño’s entrepreneurial pursuits shifted focus
towards the easy exploitation of guaranteed, Crown subsidies, which left not only the
Crown, but also Santa Elena’s residents, increasingly disillusioned.
As the sixteenth century progressed, the Crown became ever more aware of
Florida’s plights. Pedro Menéndez successfully colonized Florida but the colony itself
remained vulnerable. The Crown granted Florida its own, royal subsidy, yet after five
years the colony’s situation remained tenuous. Further, the expansion of Menéndez’s
enterprise stagnated. Therefore, the timing and reasoning behind Castillo’s investigation
merits treatment as it speaks to the Crown’s growing dissatisfaction towards the Florida
enterprise and, in particular, the behavior of the comuño. Tracing the evolution of
Menéndez’s Florida enterprise explains the reasoning for the Crown’s dissatisfaction and
ultimately, the reason behind Castillo’s extensive investigation.

8
Hailing from the Spanish province of Asturias, and specifically, the coastal town
of Avilés, the adelantado and comuño members all had extensive sea faring, wartime,
and/or commercial shipping experience. In order to attract and harness Pedro Menéndez
and the comuño’s military skills, sailing prowess, and personal funds, the Crown granted
extraordinary incentives and exemptions to entice the family to undertake Florida’s
colonization. With these royal incentives, the conquest of Florida became a colonial
enterprise dependent on private entrepreneurship to not only keep the colony afloat, but
also to make the endeavor profitable.
Table 1.1 Sample of comuño members as royal officials.
Name
Don Diego de Velasco

Post
Interim-governor

Relationship to adelantado
Son-in-law

Hernando de Miranda

Governor and adelantado

Son-in-law

Pedro Menéndez de Avilés II
Pedro Menéndez Marquéz

Treasurer
Lieutenant-governor

Nephew
Nephew

Juan de la Bandera

Munitions Keeper

Possible Nephew

Gutierre de Miranda

Governor

Hernando de Miranda’s brother

Juan de Junco

Munitions Keeper

Friend

In order for Menéndez to enjoy any royal incentives, however, he had to fulfill
several Crown-mandated requirements. The Crown ordered that Menéndez support the
five hundred men during the first year of Florida’s colonization. One hundred of these
men were to be farmers in order to encourage agricultural production in the colony. The
Crown then ordered that another one hundred men be sailors. The balance was to be filled
with skilled soldiers for the colony’s defense. For the Crown, “support” entailed the
provisioning of these five hundred men, which included the importation of hundreds of
head of livestock. Soldiers and colonists, therefore, could migrate to Florida and colonize
the land with some assurance that they would not starve. Menéndez had a window of
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three years to bring an additional five hundred settlers to Florida, which included the
transport of missionaries, and in particular Jesuits, to the colony. With a colonizing
presence of various skill sets, it would, in theory, be easier for Menéndez to “establish
two or three fortified towns”—another stipulated requirement in his contract with the
Crown.18
If Menéndez successfully colonized Florida, the Crown was prepared to
handsomely reward he and the comuño. In exchange for pouring his services as well as
his personal and familial resources into the Florida Enterprise, the Crown granted
Menéndez the right to the titles of adelantado and marquis in perpetuity, the title of
governor and captain general for two lives, a governor’s salary of two thousand ducados
(to be acquired from profits), five hundred slave licenses free of duties, twenty five
square leagues of land on which Menéndez could build his estate, and the proprietorship
of two fisheries, one of fish and the other of pearls. For the resources that Menéndez
could harness and exploit in Florida, the Crown required that the adelantado only
forward ten percent of profits during the first ten years of Florida’s colonization; this was
in contrast to the regular quinto, or one-fifteenth, that the Crown enjoyed from other
colonies. Acknowledging the extensive, seafaring experience of Menéndez and the
comuño, the Crown granted over a dozen ship licenses of varying tonnages to the
adelantado in order to supply and aid the initial stages of Florida’s colonization.
Additionally, ships under the command of Menéndez were granted out-of-fleet privileges.
Those sailing out of fleet were not required to pay the accustomed avería—a Crownimposed fee that merchants and ship owners paid to support Armada ships accompanying
and defending their cargoes. The Crown further detailed that Menéndez did not have to
18

Lyon, Enterprise of Florida, 220.
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pay almojarifazgo duties, or import and export taxes, on shipped cargoes during the first
three years of Florida’s colonization. To attract settlers, residents of Florida enjoyed a
ten-year exemption from the almojarifazgo.19
After fifty years of failed colonization attempts Philip II was eager to solve the
Florida problem once and for all. The Crown’s stance on the matter is evident through the
list of incentives it offered to Menéndez. The Crown hastened the operation further,
however, when it learned that French forces landed in Florida and built a colony. 20 Using
the eastern seaboard of North America as a base of operations, imperial rivals could
easily plunder Spanish treasure fleets returning to Spain. The French presence, therefore,
needed to be immediately addressed and permanently eradicated. The Crown agreed to
advance an additional 15,000 ducados towards the enterprise if Menéndez could ready
his forces, supply his ships, and set sail for Florida before May 31, 1565. In September
that year, Menéndez and his forces successfully expelled the French presence at Fort
Caroline, however after their military triumph was when the real work began.21
Immediately, Menéndez and his colonizing forces experienced a number of
setbacks. Agriculturally speaking, the land incentives used by the Crown to entice
Menéndez were, at first, practically worthless. Florida lacked large and concentrated
indigenous populations that, as a result, made indigenous labor difficult to exploit.
Mineral resources, such as extensive veins of gold and silver as previously found in New
Spain and Peru, were notably absent from Florida. For the indigenous population that was

19

Ibid, 220-23.
Throughout the sixteenth century, the French and Spanish Crowns quarreled over the sovereignty of
North America. Adding insult to injury, the eastern coast of North America was the last stretch of land that
treasure-laden ships passed before returning to Spain from the Americas.
21
For an extensive treatment of this episode, see chapter titled “Spanish Victory and First Foundation,” in
Lyon, Enterprise of Florida.
20
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present, their reactions to the presence of Menéndez’s colonization efforts varied
considerably, which allowed the enterprise to gain a tentative foothold in some parts of
the Florida, yet in others, fail miserably.22
Acknowledgment of the Crown’s royal incentives is critical as it forces one to
reconsider the legality of royal officials’ actions while serving at Santa Elena. The Crown
granted an overwhelming amount of freedom to Menéndez to pursue the proprietorship
model that worked best for conditions in Florida. So long as Philip II’s requirements of
conquest, colonization, expansion, and the forwarding of necessary duties were met, the
Crown largely left Menéndez and the comuño to their own devices. Incentives, however,
did not underwrite Menéndez’s cost of conquest. Building a colonial enterprise,
regardless of the Crown’s enticing offers, was a costly endeavor that required tangible
resources in order for Menéndez and the comuño to profit.
For the initially limited, economic opportunities that Florida yielded, it was
critical that Menéndez and the comuño find other resources from which to profit. When
the Crown granted Florida its own situado in November of 1570, it inadvertently ushered
in a new era of private entrepreneurship in the Florida.23 In effect, what Castillo
uncovered in 1576 was that royal officials at Santa Elena, through manipulation of the
situado, turned towards the Atlantic in order to profit, largely at the expense of persons

22

Tequesta, Calusa, and Tocobaga Indians in the southern portion of the Florida peninsula were
predominantly hostile to Spaniards, whereas to the north, and specifically around Santa Elena, Guale and
Orista Indians were much more amicable. As mentioned earlier, the vast region of La Florida had been at
the center of imperial contests for over half a century. Menéndez’s colonization forces were not the first
Europeans that Native Americans encountered in the region. Prior experiences with previous colonizing
forces (such as the French) undoubtedly influenced how Native Americas perceived Menéndez’s
colonizing presence. For further treatment on the experiences of Spanish entradas into the interior, see Paul
Hoffman and Charles Hudson, The Juan Pardo Expeditions: Exploration of the Carolinas and Tennessee,
1566-68 (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005).
23 Engel Sluiter, The Florida Situado: Quantifying the First Eighty Years, 1571-1651 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Libraries, 1985), 1.
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whom relied on the situado for provisioning and other supplies. Understanding Florida’s
royal subsidy, therefore, will provide context as to how royal officials could profit from
their newfound resource.
At Menéndez’s behest, the Crown sanctioned the situado, or royal subsidy, to aid
military personnel, particularly soldiers, in the maintenance, defense, and continued
growth of the Florida colony. The Crown ordered that situado funds be directed towards
provisioning soldiers, rewarding them for exceptional service, and the upkeep of
munitions and defense structures in the colony. As a result, the Crown correlated the
successful defense of Florida with royal officials’ stewardship of the situado. Royal
officials understood that they were to manage the situado and, by extension, the local
treasury with integrity, however it did not take long for royal officials’ treasury practices
to be tempted by the Crown’s investment in the colony. Colonization required patience,
as did fiscal returns on the exploitation of Florida’s limited resources—something that
royal officials did not have.
For Florida, the implementation of the situado was a turning point. In his book,
The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, Paul Hoffman asserts that the
permanence of the Florida settlements depended on the growth of its economy, which by
1571 was buttressed with a guaranteed, annual royal subsidy.24 When Menéndez signed
his agreement with the Crown in March of 1565, he assumed responsibility for the first
three years of Florida’s provisioning, however Menéndez quickly learned that these
responsibilities represented a looming, financial burden, as Florida rarely yielded
immediate returns on investments. If King Philip II provided an annual subsidy for what

24

Paul Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean 1535-1585: Precedent,
Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 146.
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Menéndez saw as a lagging “Florida Enterprise,”25 such an action would allow the king
to keep his empire extended in North America and keep the Carrera de Indias trade route
secure. In return, a royal subsidy would alleviate the pressure felt by Menéndez to
provision Florida’s soldiers. By granting Florida its own subsidy, numerous problems
could be addressed and, in theory, fixed.
According to Hoffman, between 1570-1578 approximately 23,000 ducats were
dispersed annually for Florida’s situado.26 Evident in the table below, however, is the
level at which situado funds varied in the first six years. Also visible is the fact that
situado funds were not subtracted from coffers in Madrid and sent to Florida. Instead, the
Crown ordered wealthier treasuries in the Americas, such as those in Mexico City and
Lima, to set aside the appropriate funding for situados.27 Military presidios, or garrisons
towns, like Santa Elena and St. Augustine benefited from this transfer. Additionally,
observations made by historian Engel Sluiter and Hoffman indicate that from 1571-1615,
the Florida situado was paid annually and in one lump sum from several American
treasuries.28 The royal treasury at Nombre de Dios covered the first three years of the
Florida subsidy, followed by the treasury at Veracruz, which covered the remainder of
the 1570s.29

25

According to Lyon, Menéndez’s agreement with the Crown to conquer La Florida was inherently a
business enterprise. The phrase “Enterprise of Florida” thus classifies and encompasses Pedro Menéndez’s
aims for personal success and family honor, both immediately and in perpetuity. See Enterprise of Florida.
26
Paul Hoffman, “A Study of Florida Defense Costs, 1565-1585: A Quantification of Florida History,”
Florida Historical Quarterly 51, no.4 (April 1973), 414.
27
A typical soldier’s plaza, or payroll position, amounted to roughly 115 ducados, or ducats, which served
to cover the cost of his provisions.
28
Engel Sluiter, The Florida Situado: Quantifying the First Eighty Years, 1571-1651 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Libraries, 1985), 3.
29
Ibid, 2.
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Table 1.2 Situado amounts (in ducados) dispersed for Florida30
Year

Veracruz Treasury

1571

Tierra Firme Treasury (Nombre
de Dios)
12,000

1572

8,280

---

1573
1574

48,296
---

--28,188

1575

---

20,587

1576

---

20,437

---

In order to bring the benefits of the situado to Florida, it was the responsibility of
a situador, i.e. a royal official, to retrieve the funds, purchase the necessary rations and
supplies for the Florida garrisons and soldiers, and return to distribute the goods and
provisions acquired.31 Theory and practice, however, are distinctly different. It was not
unheard of for an official to appoint a substitute to collect situado funds; interimgovernor of Santa Elena, don Diego de Velasco (1571-1576), claimed to have once sent a
soldier and ship pilot by the name of Iñigo Ruiz to collect the situado in Tierra Firme—a
year-long endeavor that, in the eyes of Velasco, merited a five-hundred ducado bonus,
which he gave to Ruiz from situado funds.32 Hoffman discusses the issue of appointing a
substitute situador by highlighting that Gutierre de Miranda, during his final rule as
governor of Florida (1589-93), granted a monopoly to a merchant and then sent him to
New Spain to collect the subsidy and coordinate supply purchases. Miranda’s profiteering
schemes were a source of contention for Florida residents, which, as Hoffman notes, was
one of the reasons for his overthrow as governor in 1593.33 Clearly, there was precedent

30

Sluiter, The Florida Situado, 2.
Bushnell, The King’s Coffer, 34.
32
AGI Escribania 154A, “Deposition of don Diego de Velasco,” fols. 909r-v.
33
Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 78.
31
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for soldier and settler dissatisfaction towards such maneuverings of the situado, as
evidenced in Florida in the 1570s, and specifically at Santa Elena.

Figure 1.2 Sites of situado retrieval and provisioning bases. Santa Elena, as indicated by
the yellow marker, was Spain’s northernmost American settlement in early 1576. At the
time of Castillo’s investigation later that year, however, it was in a state of temporary
abandonment. The orange markers indicate other ports connected to Santa Elena through
provision consumption, trade opportunities, and situado collection. This map also shows
the vast distances that officials in charge of situado retrieval had to travel. Located south
of Santa Elena was the site of St. Augustine, another military garrison and settlement of
La Florida. Havana, a primary provisioning base for the Florida provinces and where
most of Castillo’s witness questioning took place can be found farther south. Campeche,
Veracruz, Nombre de Dios, and Cartagena were port towns where the situado was
dispersed during its initial years and, as mentioned, sites that offered trade opportunities
for Florida officials and their respective partners.
Though there is evidence of the situado being paid annually, complaints from
Florida concerning unpaid salaries and supply shortages raise questions about its
disbursement. It is true that the funds distributed from American treasuries filling
Florida’s situado requirements were never the same as what reached the provinces. Out
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of necessity, funds from the situado were set aside to transport freight, which in and of
itself was a costly deduction. Historian Amy Bushnell provides an example of this reality,
stating that in 1577 it cost roughly 2,000 ducats to bring a year’s worth of supplies from
New Spain to La Florida—a deduction of approximately one-tenth of the situado’s
overall funds.34 Additionally, storms in the Caribbean heightened the vulnerability of
goods en route.35 It is also true, however, that royal officials and their associates
operating both in and outside of Santa Elena intended to profit from the situado.
Castillo’s investigation effectively uncovered this reality in the years following the
implementation of Florida’s subsidy and, subsequently, the animosity felt by colonists in
Santa Elena towards the disproportionate use of the situado.
The Crown wanted to know how its finances were being implemented. Sending
an investigator to Florida was the surest way of examining both Santa Elena’s royal
officials and the overall state of the colony. Though the Crown had grown increasingly
suspect of Menéndez and the comuño’s operations in Florida, a newfound urgency
brought the affairs of Florida to the forefront of the royal docket. In September of 1574,
Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, adelantado of Florida and captain general of the Armada de
la Carrera de Indias, or Indies Fleet, passed away. Less than a year later, Indians killed
three of Santa Elena’s core, treasury officials off the coast of Sapelo Island.36 News of
these events put in motion Florida’s first ever residencia.
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Before contemplating the results of Castillo’s investigation, an exploration of the
residencia and the related visita is necessary. What were these investigatory tools and
what did they seek to uncover? How did they proceed? The Crown’s use of two,
centuries-old institutions, the residencia and the visita, or judicial review and visitation,
were the primary methods it used to understand the state of affairs in the Florida colony
and primarily its royal officials’ stewardship of the local, royal treasury. Philip II ordered
Castillo to “residenciar,” or conduct residencias, for each of Florida’s royal officials. In
essence, a residencia was a review executed by a judge of an outgoing official’s conduct
during his time in office.37 The visita portion of Castillo’s investigation was much
broader. He observed the conditions in the colony by performing inspections of
storehouses and royal officials’ accounting books. Additionally, he posed to witnesses a
variety of questions about the colony’s management and, in turn, let them speak of any
particular grievances that they felt needed redress.
It was in Castillo’s best interest to treat his royal objective with honesty. As added
insurance, the Crown required that convincing evidence be forwarded in order to
substantiate criminal charges against any officials under investigation. Castillo’s
authority, however, still granted him some freedom in that he had the ability to place,
should he choose, more emphasis on certain issues, while giving less attention or none to
others. The inherent discretion at the fingertips of a visitador, therefore, should be taken
into consideration before reading any part of Castillo’s residencia.
Though meant to uncover the actual conditions in a colonial settlement, by their
very nature the residencia and the visita were limited in their aims. For example, the
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temperament of a royal inspector as well as the quality of relationship he held with an
official under inspection influenced how or if an official was condemned. From the
Crown’s perspective, who, then, qualified as both a tenable and effective investigator?
In the case of Florida, when the most capable candidate was found, he did not
have to be the most exemplary individual. The subject of Chapter Three takes place
outside Santa Elena and revolves around Baltasar del Castillo’s experiences in the Indies
Fleet and royal courts in Spain. Before filling his role as visitador of Florida, Castillo was
a contador, or royal accountant, for the Armada, then under the command of adelantado
Pedro Menéndez de Avilés. Castillo’s office required oversight of Fleet records and
providing detailed expense reports to the Crown if requested. During that time, Castillo
became quite familiar with not only the affairs of Menéndez, but also with spending his
time in court. In 1572, and again in 1573, the Casa de la Contratación and the Council of
the Indies found Castillo guilty for having commandeered and sold for personal profit
royal provisions, failing to record precious metals on board Fleet ships, and for not fully
registering the property of passengers on board Fleet vessels.38 Ultimately, the Council of
the Indies dismissed Castillo from his post as royal accountant of the Armada as well as
perpetually exiled him from Seville and the Indies.39 Despite the gravity of his
transgressions, however, the Crown acknowledged Castillo’s utility, and as such granted
him the appointment as visitador of Florida a year after his original sentencing.40
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Castillo’s appointment merits treatment because, in spite of Castillo’s previous
crimes, his knowledge of and relationship with the comuño rendered him the most able
candidate to examine and judge comuño affairs. In addition to the tasks and authority
imbued in the post of visitador, Castillo’s accounting and shipping experiences further
influenced the shape and scope of the residencia that, as a result, focused on the financial
affairs of Santa Elena and the comuño. The charges leveled against Santa Elena’s royal
officials predominantly centered on fiscal issues, including provisioning, shipping, and
general accounting. The visita questions posed to witnesses followed suit. Having gained
several years of trafficking royal provisions under the direction of Menéndez, Castillo
was able to effectively trace the consequences of these activities at a local level. In
theory, Castillo would be able to cut through intricate webs of dubious, pecuniary
dealings that seemed endemic to royal officials’ stewardship of Florida royal subsidies
and, in return, portray an accurate rendering of their affairs.
Witness testimonies collected during residencias required the Crown’s careful
deliberation. Through Castillo’s investigation, it appeared that the settlement was fraught
with problems and, to make matters worse, was led by inept, royal officials, prompting
one to wonder how the settlement survived its first ten years. A careful review of the
results of Castillo’s residencia is thus the subject of Chapter Four. When reading the
criminal charges of Castillo’s investigation, it is easy to dismiss Menéndez and comuño
members solely as corrupt abusers of power. In tandem with understanding Menéndez
and the comuño’s background, however, is important to consider the stipulations of the
adelantado’s 1565 conquest-contract with the Crown. What was agreed upon, but failed
to materialize during Florida’s colonization, undoubtedly influenced the criminal

20
behavior of Menéndez and the comuño. In other words, looking back at what was
promised by the Crown, then comparing it to the realities of Florida, helps shed light on
Castillo’s findings and what they reflected about private entrepreneurship in Florida: that
it did not aid in the physical expansion of the Spanish Empire into the region.
Table 1.3 Royal officials’ fiscal-related indictments.
Name
(position)

Pedro
Menéndez de
Avilés
(adelantado)
Don Diego de
Velasco
(governor)
Pedro
Menéndez de
Avilés II
(treasurer)
Diego Londoño
de Otálora
(factor)
Pedro
Menéndez
Márquez
(governor)
Miguel Moreno
(accountant)
Diego Enriquez
(munitions
keeper)
Juan de Junco
(munitions
keeper)
Hernando de
Miranda
(governor)
Juan de la
Bandera
(munitions
keeper)
Esteban de Las
Alas (governor)
Gutierre de
Miranda
(governor)
Rodrigo Alonso
del Bustos
(scribe)
Alonso de Solís

Charge Type
Collecting funds
from vacant
soldier plazas

Mishandling
provisions/
goods of
deceased

Profiteering/
cheating
soldiers

Bribery

Improper
Accounting/
incomplete books

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
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(governor)
Diego Ruiz
(scribe)
Bartolomé
Martín
(munitions
keeper)

X

X

The table above serves as a basic outline for the fiscal-related, criminal charges that
Castillo drew up against officials. I have chosen to simplify the charges into five,
thematic categories. One “x” does not necessarily represent a single charge but instead
serves as a marker to illustrate an official’s engagement in the activity once, or multiple
times, over the course of his career in Florida. The full list of royal officials’ charges can
be found in AGI Escribania 154A, fols. 1r-35v.
With little economic incentive to expand into Florida’s interior, it is
understandable that royal officials concentrated their entrepreneurial pursuits along
Florida’s coast and in its ports. Further influencing their decision to remain on the coast
was the introduction of Florida’s situado. Though intended for the support of Florida’s
military presence, the royal subsidy was seen by royal officials as a viable, economic
opportunity to exploit. Every royal official at Santa Elena had experience in, or
knowledge of, commercial shipping procedures, so for them, the choice was obvious.
The digressions of the comuño, however, did little to benefit the majority of Santa
Elena’s population. Soldiers and colonists explained to Castillo that royal provisions
purchased with situado funds never completely satisfied the settlement’s needs. The only
persons that colonists had to blame were local, royal officials as they monopolized Santa
Elena’s local economy through their control of situado imports and their overall
proprietorship of the Florida colony. Additionally, the cost of basic supplies and luxury
goods were exorbitant, in some cases at a 200% markup. It was expensive to import
provisions to Florida, however one of the primary incentives that brought settlers Florida
was a ten-year exemption from paying import and export taxes, known as the
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almojarifazgo. Further igniting contention in Santa Elena was the payment of situado
bonuses that were made by comuño members to themselves and to their associates.
Several soldiers, for example, testified that those who received the highest bonus amounts
never actually served in the guard company at Santa Elena. The situado
disproportionately advantaged members of the comuño that, as a result, only further
aggravated settlers and soldiers—the persons most critical to the colonization of Florida,
and consequently whose satisfaction mattered most.
Karen Paar acknowledges that social conflict was present in Santa Elena, however
she fails to identify one of the leading causes: the situado. Witness testimonies
highlighted issues like corruption and profiteering, which serve to explain the situado’s
local shortcomings. When examined at the local level, it is apparent that the comuño
controlled the local economy, including what was imported with situado funds and at
what prices they were sold. Price increases further agitated the settlement’s residents in
light of the fact that their own enterprises, predominantly agricultural, remained
stagnate.41 The situado helped provision Santa Elena, but it was never enough to satisfy
those living in the settlement, nor could everyone agree on the direction of the subsidy’s
funding. Curiosity as to who, then, benefitted the most from the situado comes to the
forefront. Due to governmental framework put in place by the Crown and Menéndez in
1565, residents of Santa Elena not connected to or in collusion with the comuño were
severely disadvantaged.
Through Castillo’s investigation, the Crown learned the consequences of loosely
supervised, royal subsidies. Loose supervision directly affected the settlement of Santa
Elena, as colonists not associated with the comuño were poorly heard. These persons first
41
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felt dissatisfaction towards the settlement’s financial stewardship, as, by design of the
comuño, colonists could not participate in the maintenance and direction of Crown funds.
Until Castillo’s arrival, ex-residents of Santa Elena had limited say in how they perceived
and were affected by treasury and shipping-related activities. Taking advantage of the
visitador’s presence was their only direct means of explaining to the Crown what had
occurred in Santa Elena and why a number of previous residents were upset with the state
of affairs in the colony.
Though Santa Elena was not the first Spanish settlement to be established in
Florida, for Menéndez and the comuño, it was by far the most important. Santa Elena
represented the flagship settlement of Spain’s imperial efforts in La Florida—a vast
expanse of land that encompassed the majority of North America. Additionally, Santa
Elena not only represented the physical presence of Spain in the region but also decades
of imperial contest, primarily with the French, as to who would control the eastern
seaboard of the continent as well as who would colonize North America. Effective
control of Santa Elena meant effective control of a key, frontier point from which further
imperial enterprises could expand.
Menéndez and the comuño expected handsome profits for what they undoubtedly
viewed as a multi-generational effort to implant Spanish hegemony in Florida. From their
perspective, Menéndez and the comuño’s personal funds and commercial experiences
were not only vital to the establishment of Florida, but to the permanency and future of
the colony. What Castillo’s investigation illustrates, however, is that in just over ten
years, the promise of a large, commercial enterprise along with the royal incentives that
came along with it, shrank to a fraction of what was originally envisioned. As evidenced
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by the detailed, criminal charges that Castillo was able to draw up, royal officials
supplemented their incomes by focusing on what they had the most experience in:
commercial shipping. The introduction of the situado required that goods be imported
into the colony. In response, royal officials exploited the colony’s royal financing, as it
was the quickest and most secure way to both finance and profit what was left of the
Florida Enterprise. For Menéndez and the comuño, their entrepreneurial activities in
Santa Elena and in Spain’s broader, transatlantic empire meant keeping their operations
on Florida’s coast. Consequently, the Spanish Crown would never see its empire expand
into North America.
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Chapter Two: Means of Investigation

The Crown was concerned over the financial situation in Florida. Only five years
prior to Baltasar del Castillo’s appointment, the Crown granted a royal subsidy to Pedro
Menéndez’s ailing, Florida Enterprise. The adelantado petitioned the Crown for royal
aid, as he was unable to supply the three hundred soldiers stationed in the colony. Despite
the presence of the situado, however, Florida still seemed to struggle. Soldiers appeared
before royal courts in Spain requesting back pay and reports of fiscal malfeasance
increased.42 Compounding these issues was the fact that Menéndez, the leading
entrepreneur of the enterprise, recently died. Less than a year later, three more treasury
officials perished.43 Though there were still other comuño members ruling in the
adelantado’s stead back at Santa Elena, the Crown became increasingly suspect of their
proprietorship. Even with the aid of the situado, colonial growth in Florida remained
stagnant. From the Crown’s point of view, by 1575 Florida’s royal officials seemed
content with overseeing Santa Elena and St. Augustine, the two, remaining settlements of
Pedro Menéndez’s Florida enterprise. This decision was not conducive to the Empire’s
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goal of territorial expansion. In order to understand the situation further as well as the
actions of its royal officials, the Crown decided to dispatch an investigator.
The Crown ordered Baltasar del Castillo to conduct Florida’s first ever residencia.
Along with an inspection of the colony, Castillo was responsible for judging the tenures
of over twelve, royal officials from Santa Elena. The investigator’s primary goal was to
judge the management of the treasury and, in particular, the use of subsidies, in the
colony.44 Why, though, had it taken over ten years for the Crown to order a residencia?
The Crown’s seemingly belated response can be answered from several
perspectives. From the beginning of Menéndez’s Florida enterprise in 1565, Philip II
permitted a great deal of freedom and flexibility in how the colony was governed. As
adelantado, Menéndez assumed complete responsibility for the establishment,
maintenance, jurisdiction, and colonial expansion within his adelantamiento. In Florida,
the only authoritative figure above him was the Crown. Not long after the colony’s
founding, however, both Menéndez and the Crown became aware of Florida’s resource
deficiency. Again, as adelantado it was up to Menéndez to figure out how to profit in
spite of Florida’s shortcomings. The advantages that the Crown afforded to Florida’s
governorship (mostly extensive shipping privileges and the absence of thorough, annual
auditing) worked for a limited number of years, yet by 1575, the Crown looked to rescind
these incentives.
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The Crown’s relationship with Florida took a decisive turn when it granted
Florida its own situado. By 1576, the enterprise had become dependent on the annual
subsidy. Castillo became aware of this dependency as the investigation unfolded. As the
Crown began investing annual, royal funds into the colony each year, proprietorship over
the affairs of Florida began to change hands. The Crown’s funds, and not Menéndez’s,
were what kept the colony afloat and supplied after 1571. It is not surprising, then, that
the Crown began to seriously consider learning about how its funds were being
implemented. Rumors of fiscal malfeasance in Florida, the continued stagnation of the
local economy, and the recent deaths of Florida’s treasury officials convinced the Crown
to launch a formal investigation.
For over seventy years, the Spanish Crown used residencias and visitas in the
Indies, however their execution across the Spanish Empire was seldom uniform and not
always successful, despite their aims being fairly straightforward. The expansion of the
Spanish empire meant that the Crown needed judicial tools to gather information and to
monitor royal officials. These inspections, however, could be rather complicated and time
consuming. The size and complexity of a bureaucracy, the depth of inspection that the
Crown desired, and the willingness of officials to cooperate all played a role in each
investigation’s final outcome. With these factors in mind, it is clear that ordering either
residencias and/or visitas was an extraordinary measure on the part of the Crown.45
The complex nature behind these institutions’ orchestration did not help matters,
either. When authorities in Madrid deemed conditions unsatisfactory in an overseas
kingdom or colony, discussion of a possible visita and/or residencias was brought to the
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forefront. It should be stressed, however, that the visita in particular was an exceptional
event and was usually the Crown and the Council of the Indies’s last resort due to the
level of difficulty that the investigation posed.46 Not only was the Council of the Indies
responsible for finding a suitable visitador to perform the task, but the Council usually
had to entice someone with expertise and a measure of finesse to fulfill the position; this
was usually done by promising a handsome salary to a potential visitador, often
accompanied by a royal appointment in the Indies once the investigation was complete.47
Moreover, the visita would take approximately two years to complete, so desirable
compensation for an investigator’s time spent navigating the affairs of a colonial
administration and/or impenetrable, overseas bureaucracy was a necessary offer on the
part of the Crown.48
As compared to other colonial settlements in the New World—the majority of
which by 1576 had transformed into satellite kingdoms with audiencias, or high courts,
associated with them—Florida’s Spanish settlements were small. Roughly three hundred
persons resided in Santa Elena before its abandonment. The limited size of the Florida
colony, however, did not render its affairs unimportant. Florida commanded attention
because of the strategic and symbolic importance it held. The colony’s coastline served to
protect Spanish fleets while the colony, and Santa Elena in particular, served as gateways
46
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into the vast, North American interior. Many stakeholders, including the Crown,
buttressed Florida’s existence by keeping the colony provisioned and colonized. Florida
affairs, especially shipping and trading enterprises, spanned across the Indies and the
Atlantic, and involved accounts attached to numerous purses, including those of the
Crown, the Indies Fleet, royal coffers in Santa Elena, St. Augustine, Veracruz, Cartagena
de Indias, Nombre de Dios, and Havana, and finally purses of private individuals with a
stake in the Florida enterprise. The expansiveness of the colony’s accounts meant that
inspection would be both difficult to execute and time consuming. Additionally, not
everyone would be willing to hand over accounts. The only factor that eased some of
Castillo’s burden was that key officials under his scrutiny were dead. Unable to assert
any resistance towards the investigator’s prying eye, Castillo’s visita and residencia
could, in theory, proceed with relative ease.
How, though, was the visita received in the colonies? Historian John Leddy
Phelan once likened the visita to “the sword of Damocles,” which could fall at any time
“…to remind viceroys and oidores alike of the tenuous nature of their authority.”49 Like a
sword falling, the visita was largely an unexpected occurrence, however authorities in
Florida were aware of the Crown’s increasing desire to spar. That said, stewards of
Florida’s treasury and their allies still experienced the temporary shock at the arrival of
an investigator, yet it was probably because of who showed up to perform the inspection.
The moment that Baltasar del Castillo, a previous friend to some and foe to others,
arrived in Cuba and eventually Florida with his visitador appointment clutched in the
palm of his hand, Florida officials knew that the sword had fallen.
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Though compliance with the King’s will was, in theory, a wise decision on the
part of Philip II’s Florida officials, they could certainly make the tasks of a visitador
difficult to execute, especially if they had something to hide. For officials, especially
those engaging in illicit activities, the visita was an unwelcomed surprise. Additionally,
the arrival of a visitador signaled that the functioning of a local bureaucracy, one that had
probably become accustomed to a unique style of administration over the years, would be
disrupted by intense, royal scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the visitador was going to find
breaches in administration that did not wholly fulfill the Crown’s wishes; royal decrees
sent to Spain’s colonies often were understood and tailored to fit a specific locale’s
needs, thus yielding the “Obedezco pero no cumplo,” or “I obey but I do not comply,”
style of colonial administration inextricably linked with the Spanish Hapsburgs. 50 In
addition to this divergence between royal wishes, local interests at times took precedence
over the Crown’s desires.
For the Crown to order a visita, the decision was undoubtedly calculated and took
time to reach. If rumors of heightened malfeasance among royal officials or severe
mistreatment of colonists and/or Indians in a specific location reached the Crown,
mandating a royal inspection was certainly a tempting, if not sensible, option. Ordering a
visita could help, and perhaps rectify (if only temporarily), the specific woes of a colony
or kingdom under a visitador’s inspection.
The Crown, however, had to weigh the visita’s benefits against its potential
consequences. Though the Crown would be gathering information about its distant
kingdoms and colonies, the pace at which a colonial administration operated would be
invariably disrupted with a visitador present. The inspector had to comb through an
50
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administration’s records, which was always a time consuming process. Additionally, an
inspector had to collect witness testimonies from both accusers of malfeasance and those
accused of such acts to supplement his investigation.
Phelan notes how the visita also functioned as a “safety valve” that the Crown’s
subjects, both elite and commoners (including indigenous vassals), could utilize to
release tensions with colonial administrators. The discord exposed (if not inadvertently
encouraged) by the presence of a visitador was, on the one hand, a potential disruption to
the colonial order. However, it also served to reinforce the loyalty of the Crown’s distant
subjects, for it gave them an opportunity to voice grievances directly to the king. Clearly,
the Crown had many facets of the visita to take into account before ordering one to be
performed, some of which were not always beneficial to the inspector or the inspected.
Overall, however, they served to inform the Crown of and reassert its patrimony in the
most distant of stretches of its royal domain.
The residencia—another method of Crown investigation into its royal officials’
behavior—differed slightly from the visita in both its aim and its execution. In essence, a
residencia focused on one particular official’s actions and decisions while in office. The
investigation was performed at the end of an official’s term in office, and carried out by
his successor, a stark contrast from the visita, which was a far broader inquiry. Charles H.
Cunningham notes that residencias could also be performed before the end of an
official’s incumbency, especially if the official in question was suspected of serious
malfeasance.51
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Judicially speaking, there were two distinct parts of a residencia.52 First, the
appointed juez de residencia, or reviewing judge, drew up a list of charges of which the
official in question stood guilty. Second, the judge collected records kept during an
official. He scrutinized them for both clarity and content. Should records have been
missing or incomplete, the judge allowed the official in question to defend the reason for
that being at the end of his investigatory work. As Cunningham notes, executing these
two portions of the residencia took a considerable amount of time to complete and it was
not uncommon for investigations to take several years. In the case of Florida, however,
the Crown wanted the inquiry to be concluded as soon as possible.
In his study of the Kingdom of Quito’s early-seventeenth century bureaucracy,
John Leddy Phelan discusses at length the possible shortcomings of the residencia. One
of the residencia’s main sources of information that judges used for weighing the guilt or
innocence of officials came from the collection of subjects’ grievances during the time
that they lived under a specific administration. Phelan notes that periodic residencias
gave colonial subjects an opportunity to voice grievances, alleged or real, against local
officials in hopes of obtaining some measure of redress. 53 For both current and previous
residents of Florida, Castillo was the Crown’s representative, and the visitador arrived
with the intent of hearing any persons who wished to come forward, in public or in
private.
Once a residencia was completed, the Crown weighed the presence/severity of its
officials’ infractions. Additionally, the Crown considered the judge’s sentences (innocent,
guilty, or unable to prove), then proceeded to uphold the sentences or tailor them to suit
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what the Crown deemed as appropriate punishment or reward for officials under
inspection. Cunningham discusses this last point with added emphasis, and insists that the
residencia was a flawed practice because its existence was not to prevent malfeasance,
but rather to only castigate it. As long as an official had solid reasoning for the infraction
and/or money and influence at the royal courts to rule in his favor, he had no reason to
fear the residencia. The Council of the Indies was notorious for overturning or lessening
sentences. Cunningham notes that the Crown appeared to be and, in fact, was largely
merciful towards its officials with criminal charges. Light sentences and future
appointments from the Crown, for example, reinforced that it was unnecessary to fear the
residencia. Though perhaps moved to a different locale or promoted to a higher post, an
official’s career was more than likely not over after his residencia was performed; for this
last reason, the threat of and potential consequences of the visita were made all the more
stronger.
In September of 1576, flanked by two royal aides, Castillo landed in Havana. His
arrival sparked both interest and commotion in the bustling port town. Castillo’s presence
would have a similar effect when he landed in St. Augustine several months later to
continue the investigation he had started in Cuba. Castillo posted notice of Florida’s
officials’ residencias, probably not far from the doors of the cathedral (for it was one of
the most visited sites in the settlement), which stated that any witness could come
forward with accusations against Menéndez and his administrative cohort of comuño
members.54 Though Castillo already had an idea as to what the criminal charges against
each official would face (seeing as he was indeed a former royal accountant for the
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armada, under Pedro Menéndez’s command), the stipulations of his office required him
to take witnesses’ testimonies into account.
Castillo was responsible for more than just executing residencias, though. His
appointment required that he inspect the colony and provide a thorough outline of
Florida’s royal officials’ treasury management practices and any proof of criminal
activity to the Crown. He was to offer recommendations for punishments, but never pass
sentence, for the Crown reserved that authority for this specific inspection. With the
evidence collected, the Crown either agreed to Castillo’s suggested punishments or it
lessened them. The Crown reduced an official’s sentencing for a number of reasons,
which included insufficient evidence, the overall value of an official towards the
maintenance and defense of the empire, and/or the political connections that an official
had at court.
For the visita portion of Castillo’s investigation, the visitador continued to
question individuals about their experiences under Florida’s administration. In addition,
Castillo inspected the records of royal officials, combed through extant treasury records,
inventoried garrison storehouses, and catalogued ecclesiastical supplies. This part of the
inquiry took place primarily in St. Augustine, but Castillo also scrutinized accounts in
Havana.
The visitador’s inspection undoubtedly added friction to an already contentious
environment in Florida and in Cuba. Castillo’s presence in the two colonies, after all,
only served to expose the activities of royal officials—posts previously held and currently
occupied by comuño members. Elites within both colonies likely possessed knowledge of
the deceased adelantado’s economic activities. Should persons have had any grievances
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towards the adelantado and the comuño’s practices, including both commoners and the
elite, Castillo’s arrival was a propitious opportunity to share their grievances. For this
reason, Christoph Rosenmüller highlights that most scholars view the results of visitas
and residencias with skepticism because though these types of investigations often
revealed flippancy and even disregard towards colonial law and order, “…their efficacy
depended on the political ties of the visitador.”55 In other words, the relationship between
inspector, accuser, and accused were often influenced by the personal ties each party had
in the royal courts and/or bribery.
Rosenmüller acknowledges that the threat of investigation may have at least
partially reined in the Crown’s overseas bureaucracy. Officials recognized the need for
upstanding character and administration otherwise they faced potential consequences.
The Crown’s punishments included demotion, suspension, fines, and even exile. Had
officials committed malfeasance, it would have been portrayed in the investigation’s
evidence and thus forwarded to the high courts, or in Florida’s case, straight to the
Council of the Indies in Spain.56
It is reasonable to situate Baltasar del Castillo’s investigation of Florida’s
governorship towards the former of these two portrayals of the visitas and residencias.
Though “the cleansing character of the procedure” did in fact shed light on issues extant
in the Florida colony, the years leading up to a possible royal inspection did not
necessarily persuade officials to put an end to widespread fiscal malfeasance. Perhaps
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they felt confident that the Crown would be lenient in sentencing and punishments
towards their transgressions.57
The private, entrepreneurial nature of Florida’s conquest and colonization
dissuaded the Crown from premature use of these institutions. Much of this decision was
rooted in the fact that Florida was, at last, a permanent Spanish colony after over fifty
years of failed attempts. Even if the colony’s early years of treasury administration
aggravated the Crown, officials in Florida managed to keep the region occupied and
defended, if barely. Royal approval of Florida’s situado in 1570 aided the colonial
venture in regards to provisioning soldiers, however by 1575 royal inspection of its use
was deemed necessary. Evidence of royal subsidies enriching officials more so than
Florida’s defenses was a direct threat to Spain’s colonial foothold in the region.
Royal leniency towards Florida’s royal officials during its early, chaotic days and,
by extension, its haphazard treasury management, could only be permitted for so long.
Thus for the Crown, the task at hand was one of how to curb illicit practices and keep its
officials loyal without inadvertently dismantling or dissuading officials from abandoning
the colony. The Crown hoped that the threat of investigations would be enough to keep
its officials in check, but occasionally King Philip II and the Council of the Indies had to
carry threats into action. The visita and residencias Castillo began in the summer of 1576
thus serve as evidence for the Crown’s desire to understand Florida’s financial situation,
yet also its increasing dissatisfaction towards Menéndez’s Florida Enterprise as the years
progressed.58

57

Rosenmüller, “Visita,” 1060-61.
Residencias and visitas had their roots much earlier in history, illustrating the Crown’s reliance on
already established methods of information gathering to assert control over its lower levels of
administration. Cunningham notes that the institution of residencia was inherited from Roman law, which
58

37
In The King’s Coffers: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702,
Bushnell discusses early attempts that the Crown used to rein in and reinforce
accountability in Florida, especially in regards to the colony’s bookkeeping procedures.
She notes that by 1570, most treasuries in the Caribbean were subjected to regular audits,
however Florida stood as a distinct outlier.59 After the colony’s founding in 1565, most, if
not all of its accounts, were intertwined with the adelantado’s personal accounts or with
those of the fleet, making audits of solely-Florida records practically impossible to
discern. The sanctioning of royal subsidies, first for the fleet and then for Florida and
Cuba in 1570 complicated auditing efforts even further; this difficulty was due to the fact
that royal funds were expended in multiple ports across the Caribbean and goods
purchased with credit (to be later cleared with situado funds) were concluded usually the
year after an audit would have been performed. Lastly, the comuño inhibited the Crown
from inspecting their records. Thus, the Crown was unable to gain a clear picture of
Florida’s fiscal situation.60 Only through experience did the Crown learn how to
overcome these obstacles.
Bushnell asserts that efficient and upright treasury administration was a “chimera”
for Florida.61 In other words, the Crown may have hoped for transparent, treasury
practices by Florida’s royal officials, but such a situation was largely idyllic.
Compounding the problem further was officials’ use of funds from the annual situado, or
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royal subsidy, to provision the colony and at the same time, profit by it.62 The only way
the Crown could achieve this was by enforcing transparency through regular auditing,
which it did not implement until after Castillo’s investigation. Even before Florida’s
situado passed, the Crown was aware of the colony’s difficulty (and perhaps obstinacy)
in practicing efficient management of the royal treasury.
Florida’s administrators had brief encounters with inspections in the past,
however the investigations never approached the scale of Castillo’s inquiry. In 1569, a
treasurer from the Indies Fleet named Andrés de Eguino began an audit of the records of
several officials with responsibilities towards the Florida’s expenses, including Juan de
Junco, a core member of the comuño and Florida’s first factor. According to Bushnell,
members of the comuño were hardly docile towards the Eguino’s audit, and in fact barred
the treasurer from sailing to Florida from Cuba to prevent him from speaking with local
residents and examining treasury records.63 Four years later, in 1573, Dr. Alonso Cáceres
de Ovando, a member of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo was appointed to investigate
the tenure of Cuba’s lieutenant governor, Pedro Menéndez Márquez. Márquez was
serving in his uncle’s place while the adelantado was away on fleet duty.64 Not long after
Cáceres arrived in Havana, however, his efforts to fulfill his appointment were once
again impeded.65 Lyon attributes Cáceres’s inability to travel to Florida to the peril posed
by hurricanes as well as Cáceres’s fear of Florida’s indigenous populations. Bushnell
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suggests a slightly different explanation, arguing that the comuño played a role in keeping
Florida affairs sealed from the Crown. Pedro Menéndez Márquez and Esteban de Las
Alas (another member of the comuño and captain in the Indies Fleet) may have
threatened Cáceres’s life by suggesting that they drop him off on the shores of Tequesta
territory—Indians known to have been hostile towards the Spanish. Needless to say,
Cáceres never fulfilled his duties.66
These early investigation efforts influenced the Crown’s decision to employ
Castillo to conduct the 1576 inquiry. As highlighted, a window of opportunity was found
when several Florida officials died between 1574-75 (including the adelantado) and a
review of each person’s administrative performance was due, i.e. the residencia. When
Castillo began his appointment, accounting issues proved to be his primary concern.
Though the Crown did find its window of opportunity, it also recognized that it
needed to proceed with caution. Yes, superiors in Spain detested Florida officials’
profiteering and general maladministration of the colony. It was deemed necessary,
however, to balance the financial woes of Florida with the fact that the region was, at last,
a landed, Spanish colony.67 Bushnell describes the Crown’s attitude towards Florida as
perhaps “capricious neglect,” arguing that such an approach, though not ideal, might have
been the best option available for keeping the colony in Spain’s empire. 68 If the Crown
and the Council of the Indies actually pursued a model of capricious neglect, they
certainly realized that upon hearing word of its royal officials’ deaths and later of Santa
Elena’s abandonment, “capricious neglect” towards Florida’s administration was no
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longer a tenable, nor wise, option. The Crown deemed efficient treasury administration,
or at the very least working towards that goal, as necessary.
During Florida’s initial years of colonization, the Crown recognized that only
through offering incentives would a post to the colony seem attractive. Certain incentives
enticed colonists, such as the promise of new land for agricultural enterprises and not
having to pay almojarifazgo duties for their first ten years of residency. The adelantado,
and by extension comuño members, would enjoy the benefits of generous shipping
exemptions, slave licenses to promote the building of the colony, and control of land and
fisheries to promote personal wealth. For the Crown, incentives such as these would, in
theory, keep officials and colonists both tied to the region and eager to exploit its
unknown wealth. Therefore, how Florida’s officials and its colonists reaped wealth was a
prerogative largely left up to their discretion. In other words, however Pedro Menéndez
and his officials chose to manage the colony’s finances had the Crown’s tacit approval.69
The freedoms that the Crown afforded to Florida’s royal officials perhaps worked
for a number of years. However by 1575, the Crown felt that these freedoms needed
rescinding, and the proprietary venture of adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés—
revoked. It was unwise for the Crown to begin this process of transformation, though,
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without first understanding local conditions. The visita and the residencia sought to
address this issue, providing the information necessary for the Crown to implement an
appropriate response. Florida’s era of “capricious neglect” was, in fact, coming to an end.
It is important to understand the visita and residencia as doing so not only helps
contextualize Castillo’s findings that were forwarded to the Crown, but also what the
Crown wished to uncover with them in the first place. As Phelan argued, at its core the
visita was the instrument used to inform the king and the Council of the Indies as to the
actual conditions of its vast empire.70 For Florida, the Crown wanted insight into how its
royal subsidies were being implemented. In a similar capacity, residencias reasserted
Crown authority through the threat, and sometimes execution, of royal punishment
against its officials. Thus, the institutions of residencia and visita forced colonial officials
to be sensitive to the wishes of its distant monarch.
Though a visita was usually an unwelcomed surprise for a colonial administration,
Florida officials were not completely shocked by the arrival of a Crown inspector in
1576. If they were shocked, it was undoubtedly because of the investigator’s identity, for
Castillo was a former colleague of the comuño, and, by extension, participant in
Menéndez’s Florida Enterprise. Further, the deaths of Florida’s treasury officials would
have brought a juez de residencia to the shores of Florida at some point. But even before
their untimely deaths, Florida officials knew they were under increasing royal scrutiny. 71
It was necessary, though, for the Crown to proceed with a degree of caution when
investigating Florida affairs, as the cult of the adelantado, the comuño, was a critical
component of Spanish colonization efforts of the North American southeast. To have
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carried out punishment against the adelantado before his death stood the chance of
interfering with shipping and defense. Harsh reprimanding of the comuño threatened
those who finally “conquered” Florida Provinces after five decades of failed attempts. As
much as the Crown yearned for information regarding its colonies, threatening Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés’s colonial foothold in North America with a full-scale inspection
was initially viewed as unnecessary. Additionally, rushing into residencias and a full
scale visita during Florida’s nascent years would have yielded what the Crown already
knew was the case: first, chaos within the treasury, and second, all of the issues
associated with colonizing new lands, such as food and labor acquisition as well as
possible tumult with establishing Spanish and Indian relations. The colony needed to
mature and the Crown needed to wait for an opportunity.
As a result of his efforts, Castillo’s investigation into officials and associates
operating both in and outside of Florida brought the Crown a fairly detailed rendering of
Florida officials’ shipping and trading enterprises. Visita questions predominantly
addressed fiscal matters within the colony and the Florida officials’ maneuverings with
royal subsidies; criminal charges made against officials shared a similar theme.
Rosenmüller observes that the Spanish Crown “…usually nominated experienced lawyers
and clergy for the post of visitador” but in the case of Florida, King Philip II and the
Council of the Indies understood that they needed someone with a different background,
especially if their brief experience with Dr. Alonso Cáceres and Florida’s local
bureaucracy taught them anything.72 Though charged with the same general tasks as
previous visitadores in Spain’s other American colonies, Castillo’s adept skills in
accounting and familiarity with Menéndez’s trading operations in the Indies made him an
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attractive candidate.
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Chapter Three: Investigating the Investigator

While overlooking the construction of one of Spain’s most imposing palaces in
San Lorenzo de El Escorial, King Philip II signed official orders for Baltasar del Castillo
y Ahedo to travel to the distant Florida provinces, a quarter of a world away, with a very
specific mission to fulfill.73 The king’s instructions were clear: Castillo was to conduct a
full residencia, or judicial review, of the governorship of Florida’s recently deceased
adelantado, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, and investigate the tenures of each one of
Florida’s royal officials.74 Extending Castillo’s authority further, Philip approved orders
for the appointed visitador to examine the accounts of those individuals in order to gain a
deeper understanding of how the Florida colony was being managed. Castillo’s
examination included taking inventory of artillery and ensuring that local justice was
being administered. Moral and ecclesiastical matters, such as the colony’s adherence to
Christian doctrine and Castilian law, were also under the jurisdiction of the investigator.
The Crown also granted the visitador permission to imprison wrongdoers as he saw fit.75
When King Philip II signed Castillo’s orders in December of 1575, it had been
roughly two years since Castillo’s last visit to the Indies. His absence from the New
World was due to the fact that he was serving an exile sentence in Spain for illegally
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trafficking Crown provisions aboard the Indies Fleet. In addition to these infractions, the
Crown found Castillo guilty of not properly recording highly valued shipments aboard
the fleet’s galleons.76 Castillo and his treasurer counterpart, Florencio de Esquivel, had
also failed to provide accurate accounting of averias77 for merchant vessels. For these
actions, Castillo was exiled from the Indies and Seville in perpetuity and was stripped of
his title as contador of the Fleet system (then commanded by Adelantado Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés). In addition, Castillo was ordered to pay fines in excess of 50,000
maravedies for his transgressions—approximately one quarter of his annual contador
salary. In response to the court’s sentencing, Castillo implored the Crown to reverse the
sentencing. He found success only several years later, however, when the Crown
appointed the ex-fleet accountant as the judge of Florida’s first ever residencia.78
The Crown felt overwhelmingly ignorant in regards to Florida’s affairs. Ten years
had passed since Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and accompanying militiamen ousted French
colonists in La Florida, claiming the lands for Spain. Yet a full-scale investigation into
the colony as well as its royal officials had yet to take place. Attempts had been made to
inspect the accounts of certain comuño members, but these small-scale investigations
were usually hindered in some way.79 These officials, who were now under the scrutiny
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of Castillo, “were the interpreters of local rights and the king’s law,” and were
responsible for maintaining and promoting the health of the local treasury. 80 Castillo’s
appointment sought to uncover if Florida’s royal administration had achieved these goals.
Shortly after Castillo landed in St. Augustine to initiate the residencia and visita,
witnesses were encouraged to come forward with their observations, grievances, and
impressions as to how Florida’s settlements had been governed for the previous ten years.
Castillo and his assistants carefully recorded the testimonies, judged the content, and then
compiled the paperwork for the Crown to review. On the matter of such information
gathering, Italian historian of the Americas Duccio Sacchi states that, “In their final
reconstruction the judges must take into account both the need to confirm royal authority
by punishing behavior outside of the norm, but also the need to respect local customs and
political balance in order to maintain a stable and functional administration of the
territory.”81 Castillo tread this fine line judiciously, as both the governorship of the
provinces and the livelihood of its residents were in a precarious position when the
visitador arrived. In June 1576, Florida’s northernmost settlement of Santa Elena had
been abandoned and all of Florida’s core, treasury officials were dead. The way in which
Castillo navigated Florida’s predicaments, however, was not only influenced by what his
appointment entailed, but also the five previous years’ experience Castillo gained
working with Menéndez, the comuño, and the Indies Fleet.
Delving into Castillo’s past is essential in order to understand the nature of his
investigation, the manner in which it proceeded, and ultimately what it revealed to the
could to benefit their personal and familial wellbeing. Governorship of Florida and Cuba from that point
forward was separated. See Bushnell, The King’s Coffers, 122.
80
Ibid, 107.
81
Duccio Sacchi, “Gathering, Organization, and Production of Information in Sixteenth-Century Surveys in
Hispanic America,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 23, n.2 (2000), 299.

47
Crown. The punishment he received from the Crown for mismanagement of royal
revenues and subsidies (whereas Menéndez as captain general, for example, did not
receive punishment) as well as his extensive knowledge of Menéndez’s trading
operations made Castillo an attractive candidate for rooting out malfeasance in Florida.
Understandably so, Castillo was upset by his dismissal from office and exile from both
the Indies and Seville; yet from the Crown’s point of view, the hardships inflicted upon
Castillo and, by extension, the condemning mark on his career, could perhaps transform
him into an effective inspector. Essentially, Castillo was shown mercy with Philip II’s
royal appointment; however, it was necessary for the former fleet accountant to earn his
merit and in turn, reassert his status.
Surprisingly little has been written about Castillo’s life and career, despite the
implications that his background had on investigations into Florida’s governorship.
Historian Karen Paar’s study of sixteenth-century Santa Elena, based heavily upon the
documentary evidence produced by Castillo’s efforts, fails to give any treatment to the
investigator’s identity and its possible implications. Where, for example, did Castillo’s
sympathies lay? He was an active participant in the residencia who wielded enormous
influence over the types of questions asked, how they were asked, and what type of
information he wished to gain. Castillo’s relationship with the accused, be it positive,
negative, or somewhere in between, determined the laxity or severity of the criminal
charges he placed against officials. Gaining a fuller understanding of Castillo, therefore,
is essential to understanding how his rendering and presentation of Florida’s officials,
and specifically those at Santa Elena, appeared before for the Crown. Philip II and the
Council of the Indies expected a thorough investigation, one that was even more
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incriminating than it would have been had someone else been appointed as visitador; for
this to be achieved, the Crown fully acknowledged the personal histories of potential
investigators, but ultimately appointed Castillo for the promise that his experiences
demonstrated.
Castillo’s relationship with those he was ordered to investigate was influenced by
his experiences under the command of adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.
Exploration of this facet of Castillo’s background provides the necessary context to
understand the Crown’s desire for appointing Castillo to conduct the Florida residencia
and visita. Additionally, the credibility of Castillo’s judiciary examination amidst
numerous scandals and unrest in Florida comes to the forefront in light of his previous
history with the very officials he was ordered to examine.
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Figure 3.1: Title page of Baltasar del Castillo’s passenger license82

To date, historians Amy Turner Bushnell and Eugene Lyon have provided the
most in-depth examinations of Castillo, roughly a paragraph in each of their respective
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books.83 Though Bushnell and Lyon’s treatment of Castillo’s background is a mere
sketch, their observations offer a tantalizing window into an exploration of Castillo’s life
before the investigations occurred. When the visitador’s previously gained experience is
scrutinized, not only does the 1576 inspection of the Florida colony and its officials
receive the contextualization it merits, but also the thought process of the Spanish Crown
is exposed. In order to gain both accurate and valuable information of its colonial
administrations, occasionally the Crown had to rely on individuals who were not the most
upright subjects. In these instances, the Crown recognized and appointed these
individuals for their knowledge, not for their honor.
Through the Crown’s choice of Castillo as visitador, Philip II and the Council of
the Indies sought enlightenment in regards to the Menéndez’s Florida enterprise, and
specifically, the treasury and accounting side of it. Almost four years had passed since the
Crown’s decision to sanction Florida’s annual royal subsidy—an allotment of funds with
which Castillo was quite familiar since he served as accountant in the Indies Fleet.
Undoubtedly, the Crown wished to learn more about how its royal funds and provisions
were being used and abused in Florida, hence naming Castillo as visitador.
The Crown granted the title of contador of the Armada to Castillo in 1568, with a
handsome annual salary of 200,000 maravedies. With the king’s signature “Yo el Rey”
affixed to the end of the document, the Crown ordered Castillo to travel to Florida in
order to take up his office. In what would be the first of many encounters and future trade
dealings with armada officials, the Crown ordered Castillo to present his assignment to
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officers of the Indies Fleet, who would be awaiting his arrival in Seville’s port on the
Guadalquivir River—the city’s transatlantic shipping artery to the New World.
Castillo was to keep an account book of expenses, oversee the office of the
treasurer, take charge of the royal coffers, and monitor annual expenditures. As part of
his appointment, Castillo was also charged with keeping a record of tribute paid by local
Indians and ensuring that the tesorero Florencio de Esquivel took account of and paid
almojarifazgo84 duties. Castillo’s assignment was clear.85 It was in Castillo’s best interest
to execute each of these tasks with rigor and transparency, however with the sheer
volume of trafficked goods as well as the number of ships that participated in the Fleet
each year, Castillo was undoubtedly tempted to at least delegate some of his
responsibilities, and by necessity give some tasks precedence over others.86 Castillo could
choose to flout some of his responsibilities, and even exploit the powers that had been
granted to him.87 He was not the only official on board the Fleet, however, to be
presented this set of administrative choices. Castillo worked alongside other high-ranking
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officials, including Menéndez and comuño members, who constantly made decisions as
to how the fleet should be managed.88
Castillo’s previous relationship with Florida’s royal officials (and, by extension,
knowledge pertaining to the colony’s condition) is confirmed when attention is given to
the affairs of the Fleet. In 1571, Florida’s adelantado drafted a petition to officials from
the Casa de la Contratación, or House of Trade, requesting additional aid to help supply
Florida’s 150 soldiers and officials with clothing and other provisions. Presented to the
Casa by Fleet officials Castillo and Esquivel in March of 1571, Casa officials responded
to the petition with scorn, reminding Esquivel that a mere month earlier, four thousand
ducats had been granted at his insistence for extra provisioning. After hearing how the
Casa in Seville received his officials, Menéndez turned to officials in San Lucar de
Barrameda, the second most important port in the Iberian Peninsula during the late
sixteenth century, to take matters into his own hands. There he was able to arrange the
outfitting of a one hundred-ton ship, filled mostly with clothing, provisions, and
munitions that would sail to Florida.89
As per their office descriptions, Castillo and Esquivel were wholly responsible for
the cargo’s safe shipment across the Atlantic. Menéndez further dictated that, in
particular, the clothing loaded onto the vessel was to be divided among Hernando de
Miranda, Menéndez’s son-in-law, and the Fleet’s accountant, Baltasar del Castillo. By
ordering that the clothing be “divided,” several meanings can be inferred; perhaps the
division of the clothing among officials helped delegate the responsibility of the
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clothing’s safe passage across the Atlantic. A more likely explanation is that Menéndez
ordered the clothing be divided so that it could be sold on the officials’ behalf once it
reached the two Florida garrisons. There is precedent for the latter possibility, seeing as
Menéndez often permitted his men to embark on their own trading ventures.90
The issue on this specific occasion, however, was that the Casa had actively been
subverted in order for Menéndez and a fleet of ships to leave for Florida. In the port of
San Lucar de Barrameda, after having received news that Menéndez planned to leave
regardless of the Casa’s blessing, the Casa temporarily withheld the ships’ departure.
Casa officials insisted that three additional chalupas accompany the ships bound for
Florida; they would follow the Florida-bound ships until they reached the port of
Havana.91 Menéndez obliged, but not without tailoring the Casa’s plans. Out of the three
chalupas, one left the port fully provisioned, but without proper licensing. Consequently,
the Casa’s records would be incomplete and/or incorrect, for the supply ship’s provisions
left without having been fully accounted.92
Fleet and Casa officials were in frequent contact, as the Casa orchestrated the
shipment and receipt of both goods and people to and from the Indies. As a consequence
of the Casa’s importance to the maintenance of the Spanish empire, proper and accurate
documentation were required by the Casa in order for it to properly function. Should
officials from the Casa be dissatisfied with accounting procedures, especially those of
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officials who operated its most vital artery, the Indies Fleet, it was not unheard of for the
Casa to order its own investigations and legal suits.
Though the fleet was the legal responsibility of Menéndez and the Crown, Casa
officials did not cease their efforts to investigate. In late 1572, Baltasar del Castillo and
Florencio de Esquivel, the Fleet’s accountant and treasurer, were involved in legal suit
with the Casa. The story of their initial apprehension unfolds rather dramatically,
beginning with the dispatch of alguacil, or constable, Marcos Bravo from the Casa in
Seville. Bravo was charged with locating, arresting, and escorting Baltasar and Florencio
back to the Casa’s prison, where the two men were to be detained until their sentencing.
Unfortunately for Bravo, the task at hand was not simple and in the end proved rather
humiliating. Bravo testified that initially he could not locate the officials, however with
some guidance from a local resident, the alguacil made his way towards the Puerta de
Jerez, located on the southeastern portion of Seville’s city walls. 93 Bravo eventually
found both Baltasar and Florencio. He informed the two men that by order of the Casa, he
was charged to make their arrest and transport them to the Casa’s jail. The royal
accountant and treasurer simply laughed in Bravo’s face.
According to Bravo’s version of the events, Florencio allegedly told the alguacil
that the men would make their own way to the Casa in half an hour. Unsatisfied with
their response and under the pressure of his duty, Bravo protested. The alguacil’s servant,
Andrés Pizzaro, added additional details about the incident, testifying that when
Florencio refused Bravo’s demands, Bravo seized the official’s horses’ reins. In response,
Florencio threateningly grabbed the hilt of his sword before spurring his horse into
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action.94 According to Bravo, Castillo and Esquivel proceeded to hurl insults at the fiftyyear-old constable before riding away on horseback. With his servants at his side, Bravo
pursued the fleeing armada officials, only to be met with Florencio’s call that he would
go to the Casa, but not with Bravo. Castillo was far ahead of Florencio in what each
person likely perceived as an absurd chase. Clearly, the fleet’s accountant was unwilling
to submit to the orders of a Casa representative, and left humiliated, Bravo was unable to
fulfill his objective.95
One of the most telling aspects of the arrest ordeal was that Castillo and Esquivel
insisted that the Casa had no right to arrest them in the first place. Their crimes, if in fact
they had committed any, were to be judged by the fleet’s captain general, Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés, not by Casa officials. After all, Menéndez was the only person
Castillo and Esquivel were ordered to answer to, aside from the king himself.96 In his
testimony, the corredor de caballos, or horse broker, Luís de Córdova attested to Castillo
and Esquivel’s proclamations, explaining that on the day of their attempted arrest,
Córdova had entered Esquivel’s dwelling, where he found another alguacil from the
Casa, Agustín de la Cabex, in the process of informing Esquivel and Castillo of their
impending arrests. According to Córdova, even after seeing the Casa’s arrest orders, the
men insisted, “we do not have to go nor answer to the judges of the Casa because Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés is our judge and the only person knowledgeable of our affairs.”
Unlike Bravo, the alguacil Agustín de la Cabex did not put up a fight, and proceeded to
leave the residence empty-handed.97
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Before long, Esquivel finally ceded to the Casa’s demands that he turn himself in
to the authorities, though it was a decision he later came to regret. The Fleet’s treasurer,
and eventually Castillo himself, made their way to Seville, hoping to resolve the conflict
at the Casa once and for all. Menéndez was present to assist and defend his officials’
positions, however the degree to which he assisted is questionable, seeing as the
defendants were arrested in spite of “their judge” being present at the court proceedings.
During the trial, Casa officials sought to learn the truth about Castillo and Esquivel’s
accounting negligence, probing the officials as to why two armada galleons, for example,
avoided checking in at the ports of Havana and San Lucar de Barrameda on their return
journey across the Atlantic.98 In addition, casa officials charged Castillo and Esquivel for
alleged shortcomings in the logging and maintenance of bienes de difuntos, or properties
of the deceased, records.
Clearly irritated with the proceedings against his officials, the adelantado
reminded the judges that the men on trial were under his command, not the Casa, and
therefore, Casa officials did not have jurisdiction over them. 99 Menéndez insisted that on
one particular occasion, while several ships were being outfitted for Florida, all payments
(predominantly avería payments) had been made in full compliance with the king’s law.
Sharpening his defense of the accused officials, Menéndez testified that the Crown
wished for a speedy departure, which fleet officers were attempting to give to him but
were being inhibited from doing.100
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With the adelantado present, Castillo and Esquivel each probably sighed with
relief, however the scandal that brought the armada officials to court in the first place was
troublesome enough that the Casa judges questioned Castillo and Esquivel’s careers on
board the Indies Fleet. The contador and tesorero failed to register a significant quantity
of gold, silver, and pearls that were being transported from the Indies back to Spain.
Additionally, “many people” went unregistered, which also meant that their personal
belongings went unaccounted for by Castillo and Esquivel. For example, one passenger
named Damacio de Sauzedo transported 20,000 unregistered, silver pesos on board one
of the fleet’s ships.101 Needless to say, Castillo and Esquivel’s inability to produce
accurate, fleet registries angered the Casa. In their final judgments, Casa officials fined
both men, suspended them from their offices, and exiled them from Seville for a year—a
punishment that the Council of the Indies augmented and enforced less than a year later,
with much more rigor.102
Considering the case’s outcome, it seems likely that Menéndez’s defense of
Castillo and Esquivel was rooted in pragmatism, not out of genuine concern for their
wellbeing.103 Referring back to Castillo’s original appointment as the Fleet’s contador in
1568, it is crucial to recognize that both he and Esquivel were outside appointments (in
that they were not related to Menéndez) made by the Crown to fill prominent positions
within the Indies Fleet. It was common and often encouraged by the Crown for royal

101

Ibid, fols. 1r-13v.
AGI Justicia 1184, N.2, R.3, “Los oficiales que fueron de la armada…contra el fiscal de su magestad
sobre la condenacion que se les hizo en la visita que se les tomo,” July 23, 1573, fols. 573v-74r.
103
Ibid, December 9, 1573, fol. 1r.
102

58
posts to be occupied by close relatives of influential men like Pedro Menéndez de Avilés,
yet the Crown imposed limitations to this practice, though not expressly stated.104
Beginning around the same time as Castillo’s legal problems with the Casa, the
Council of the Indies ordered an audit of captain general Pedro Menéndez and other
Fleet’s officials’ records.105 Doctor Gómez de Santillán, a member of the Council,
conducted the audit. For the time sensitive schedule of the Fleet, the Crown needed to
execute the audit with rigor and accuracy.106 It did not take long for Santillán to discover
several officials’ blatant disregard toward shipping procedures, which included the
Fleet’s accountant and treasurer, Baltasar del Castillo and Florencio de Esquivel. Upon
royal inspection of the records that Castillo and others were charged to keep, Santillán
uncovered fraudulent activities such as not recording all of the gold and silver on ships,
and the illegal trade of royal provisions, among other crimes.107
Unfortunately for Castillo and Esquivel, Santillán condemned both men, and
neither joined the Fleet’s next journey across the Atlantic. Castillo and Esquivel’s legal
representative, Sebastian de Santander, attempted to spare his accused clients, reminding
the Council of the Indies of their dedicated services. Santander explained that since 1564,
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Castillo served in fleets operating in both the Mediterranean and the Indies. During each
appointment, he always kept honest and thorough accounts. By including such details,
surely Castillo’s services to the Crown would have helped counter the charges leveled
against him. The evidence, however, was stacked against the contador. Castillo was
removed from office and exiled from both the Indies and Seville in perpetuity.
Furthermore, the Council of the Indies denied hearing any further defense on the matter,
stating that neither Castillo nor Esquivel were permitted to appeal to the Crown.108
Undoubtedly fuming with anger as the Council handed down his sentence,
Castillo pondered his unfortunate situation. Several of his former colleagues and
overseers, including Menéndez, managed to evade punishment, however Castillo did not.
The Adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés was not stripped of his grand titles or his
salary, nor were other family members and close friends of Menéndez. Simply put,
Menéndez was too valuable for the Crown to dismiss, but someone had to be punished
for not executing the tasks of their royal appointments. Considering Sacchi’s explanation
that judges were responsible for finding a delicate balance between asserting the Crown’s
dominance yet not wholly disrupting the political structures that undergirded a specific
locality, it is clear that the same logic applied to the Indies Fleet. Found guilty by the
Council of the Indies for overstepping the boundaries of his office, Castillo’s actions and
relationship with Menéndez deemed him worthy of punishment.
For Menéndez, it was necessary to direct his energies towards the Florida
enterprise. Court cases, such as those of Castillo and Esquivel, interrupted the
adelantado’s operations. Menéndez was not related to them either; in the sixteenth
century, maintenance of familial name and honor required significant energy, so perhaps
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Menéndez’s defense of Castillo and Esquivel’s actions may not have been as strong due
to that fact.109 The adelantado reserved his energy and loyalty to the preservation of his
kin and comuño members. In recognition of this, Castillo undoubtedly took the same
approach during the residencia: he, not being related to Menéndez or the comuño, could
execute his royal orders without regard for the preservation of their honor.
Only a few years would pass before Castillo’s fortune changed. Despite his
tarnished history with the Casa and the Council of the Indies, the Crown still recognized
Castillo as a valuable asset to the Empire. Clearly adept in accounting and bookkeeping,
the Crown appointed Castillo to conduct the residencias of Florida’s royal officials and a
visita of the colony’s affairs. At first, the Crown’s logic appears flawed, if not
counterintuitive. Just two years earlier, Castillo had been removed from office and exiled
for stealing from the royal purse. To make matters worse, the Crown had appointed
Castillo and Esquivel as outside officials to help curb such activity (in their case, aboard
the Indies Fleet). As Lyon states, “The king appointed royal financial officials to assume
Crown revenues would be accounted for and forwarded to Spain.”110 The king’s coffers
could not afford the behavior of men like Castillo and Esquivel. Their transgressions,
however, did not render them useless.
Florida’s visitador needed to be someone with ample experience in commercial
shipping, accounting and, if possible, familiarity with illicit trading. 111 Castillo’s
appointment is understandable when considering the climate of fiscal abuse on board the
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Fleet and in the Indies towards the use of royal subsidies. Castillo was familiar with the
handling of Crown’s funds and royal provisions, so in theory his abilities could be
directed towards the examination of Santa Elena’s treasury practices. He would be able to
trace the use of royal subsidies with considerably more ease compared to someone with
less experience. Who better to examine Florida’s officials than someone who already
knew those on trial and possessed intimate knowledge of their affairs? In addition, it is
probable that Castillo held several years of contempt towards at least several of Florida’s
officials, a fact that the Crown took into account when considering who to appoint as
visitador. For example, it seems highly likely that Castillo did not care for don Diego de
Velasco. Castillo levied the greatest number of criminal charges against the interim
governor of Santa Elena—twenty-nine in total—as compared to the adelantado, who
only received eighteen.
For the first time since the founding of St. Augustine in 1565, a formal
investigation into the tenure of each official’s post would be executed, providing the
Crown with a clearer picture of Florida and its inhabitants. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés
(though deceased by the time of Castillo’s appointment), along with his family members
and close friends, were at the mercy of the visitador.
In an exercise of pragmatism, the Crown negotiated Castillo’s sentence,
effectively overturned his exile, and ordered him to return to the Indies. By the 1570s,
Philip II was deeply concerned over Florida’s affairs, and in particular, how the colony’s
royal subsidy was being used. The comuño was notorious for keeping its affairs
encapsulated; therefore the Crown needed someone with prior knowledge of their
operations to conduct the investigation. Though previously condemned, Castillo was
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worth more to the Crown as an investigator than he was as a dismissed and exiled
accountant. The Crown was confident in Castillo’s abilities and that he could navigate the
investigation with relative ease.
Castillo’s background,

therefore, influenced

the outcome of

Florida’s

investigation. His unquestionable experience with commercial shipping while under the
command of Florida’s adelantado informed the types of questions he asked witnesses
and, ultimately, the nature of royal officials’ indictments. His reports were incredibly
detailed about Santa Elena’s finances as well as how comuño members managed the local
economy. Well versed in accounting and knowledgeable about the trafficking of royal
provisions, Castillo’s investigation revealed to the Crown that comuño members, who
were still very much participants in the Florida enterprise, found the situado to be the
most reliable resource to exploit. With the ample evidence that Castillo forwarded to the
Crown, Philip II and the Council of the Indies wrested from the comuño, or at least
attempted to, the entrepreneurial freedoms they had enjoyed for over ten years. It was
evident that Santa Elena’s royal officials had no intention of expanding the Empire into
North America, so the Crown took control over the enterprise. Castillo’s background,
therefore, directly influenced the Crown’s decision to separate civil from proprietary
government in Florida.
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Chapter Four: Royal Subsidies and the 1576 Residencia

In February of 1576, roughly ten years after Santa Elena’s founding, disgruntled
settlers and soldiers of the settlement drafted a letter to the Crown. In the presence of
Florida’s governor, the Adelantado Hernando de Miranda, the letter’s authors informed
King Philip II of the severe hardships they faced in Santa Elena.112 Together, the settlers
and soldiers claimed that they were struggling and that their agricultural pursuits failed to
yield the profits they had envisioned. In addition, they explained that they had not
received any assistance to correct the matter, “save our own arms.” 113 According to the
letter’s authors, the recently-deceased Adelantado Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had not
fulfilled the promises of a royal ordinance. Issued in Spain, the ordinance stated that
settlers would be given twelve head of cattle and a bull, would be established on good
soil, and would be given allotments of land in order for them to start their lives over in a
new, colonial settlement in Florida.114 These persons were predominantly farmers who
had risked their lives and their fortunes to settle at Santa Elena. The men expected
financial success largely through agricultural enterprises, yet they were unable to realize
their ambitions because, according to them, the adelantado had failed to distribute
promised lands and livestock.
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As if the letter’s authors had not suffered enough, those who expressed their
desire to depart from Santa Elena additionally voiced concern over the “ill treatment” and
insults they received from local royal officials. In the sixteenth century, preserving and
perpetuating personal and familial honor was crucial to Spaniards’ reputation in a small,
peripheral settlement like Santa Elena.115 Voiced by over a dozen residents of varying
socioeconomic statuses, the problems outlined in the letter merited the Crown’s attention,
for colonists wished to leave Santa Elena in order to find better economic opportunities
elsewhere in the Empire. From the Crown’s perspective, their proposal was unacceptable.
Santa Elena, the Crown’s northernmost, colonial settlement, needed to stay colonized in
order for Spanish hegemony to remain in the region.116
The letter serves to highlight the factional nature of the colony, which had been
brewing for quite some time, especially between settlers and the comuño. At least a dozen
people expressed their desire to leave Santa Elena. If royal ordinances were not met or
fulfilled, and there was enough backing and momentum from persons in influential
positions, the entire colonial venture could be dismantled. Unbeknownst to the letter’s
authors, however, they would have their opportunity to express their grievances directly
to the Crown when the royal investigator Baltasar del Castillo y Ahedo arrived in Florida
later that year.
Even though the Spanish Crown provided an annual subsidy for the maintenance
of the Florida garrisons, the funds did little to stabilize the colony’s economy, nor did it
benefit Santa Elena’s residents in the same way that it benefitted Florida’s royal officials.
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In reality, it was not meant to serve everyone, as the Crown implemented it to support
Florida’s military presence. With control of the subsidy lodged in comuño hands,
however, it became clear that they, and not soldiers, would be benefitting most from its
presence.117
Though implementation of the situado proved to be problematic in its early years,
its introduction was nevertheless a turning point for the Florida colony. The financial
livelihood of 150 soldiers effectively transferred over to the Crown, permanently and in
perpetuity. If Menéndez could no longer afford them, the Crown certainly could, as
keeping Florida under Spanish control was the whole point of the Florida Enterprise. In
addition to subsidizing Florida’s soldiers, the Crown changed another critical component
of the colony’s economy by rewriting the descriptions of Florida’s royal treasury offices;
the treasurer, accountant, and factor-overseer now held their titles for life.118 Perhaps
stability could finally be achieved for Florida. Unfortunately, this was not the case in
Santa Elena.
Royal assistance was vital in the colony’s early days, however it became a
permanent, profitable venture for royal officials with the Crown’s approval of the annual
situado. The subsidy became the primary, economic engine for the colony. As a result, it
held the potential for both profit and investment. Only comuño members and their trading
associates, however, could participate in these entrepreneurial pursuits. What was
originally the Crown’s means to provide for Florida’s defense quickly turned into a
profiting scheme for Florida’s royal officials.
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In Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century, historian Alejandro de la
Fuente claims that Florida’s market became the second most significant market for
Havana, only behind that of New Spain. De la Fuente’s argument is valid, seeing as the
introduction of the Florida situado along with Menéndez’s governorship of Cuba (granted
by the Crown in 1567) created a strong, provisioning link between the two colonies. Even
before the formal existence of the Florida subsidy, though, de la Fuente observes that
between 1566-1570, the export trade of Havana’s market goods to Florida was worth
roughly half a million reales (roughly one-third of the approximate 23,000-ducado
subsidy). The exports purchased for Florida were predominantly foodstuffs, which
included livestock, cured meat, and agricultural products such as corn, olive oil, and
wine. Also acquired were textiles and clothing.119 It is apparent that the commercial, as
well as governmental, link between Florida and Cuba enabled Florida’s residents,
officials, and economy to survive, and seemingly with a degree of stability. Given the
nature and amount of these exports, however, it seems as though Florida officials, and by
extension their military dependents, became almost entirely dependent on the situado for
provisions and trading opportunities; de la Fuente asserts that situado funds were, after
all, Florida’s main source of income.
As the previous chapter outlined, Castillo’s extensive background in accounting
influenced the scope and focus of the residencia, which predominantly targeted royal
officials’ financial maneuverings. With a judicious examination of the indictments
charged by Baltasar del Castillo to several Florida officials, it will become clear that the
situado was used in ways that upset the settlement’s social fabric. Examination of local
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grievances concerning how the situado was implemented will shed light on the friction
that developed between colonists and royal officials.
Baltasar del Castillo began his residencia by investigating Florida’s acting
governor, Gutierre de Miranda. Castillo’s indictment of Miranda was light when
compared to the number of charges leveled against other senior officials, namely the lateadelantado and interim-governor don Diego de Velasco. The investigator only placed
three charges against Miranda, yet despite the brevity of the list, fiscal irregularities were
present. During Miranda’s tenure as governor, he kept a Frenchman by the name of
Guillermo in his service. Miranda used the Frenchman’s presence to collect an extra
soldier’s plaza.120 Miranda’s brief list of criminal charges can be attributed to a number
of factors. Miranda had only been acting-governor for several months when Castillo
arrived in St. Augustine to begin his royal investigation in November of 1576. Miranda
was temporarily filling the position of governor in light of the fact that his brother,
Hernando de Miranda, had fled his post at Santa Elena in the wake of the settlement’s
abandonment roughly five months earlier.
Castillo’s examination of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés’s governorship highlights
the effects that royal subsidies, and eventually the situado, had on Santa Elena’s
economy. In total, Castillo charged the deceased adelantado with eighteen crimes, the
majority of which related to fiscal matters. The charges that concern the economic
structure of Santa Elena and, more broadly, Florida and the Caribbean, were as follows:
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1. Sending one of the eighteen provision ships from the Sancho de Archiniega
reinforcement fleet of 1566 (approximately a 150-200 ton vessel) to Campeche without
having unloaded a single provision in order to sell and trade its contents.
2. Not ensuring the proper management and record keeping of deceased peoples’
property and assets.
3. Ordering Pedro Menéndez Marquez, his nephew and lieutenant, to captain a thirty-ton
vessel filled with clothing, provisions, and other goods to be launched from St. Augustine
in order to trade its contents elsewhere in the Indies.
4. In general, allowing himself and his lieutenants to sell provisions such as wine, oil, and
other valuable goods in Havana and other places without keeping record of such frequent
activities.
5. Permitting Sancho de Archiniega to sail back to Spain and sell a portion of the allotted
provisions and goods prepared for Florida after the reinforcement fleet landed in 1566
(approximately two or three vessels of the eighteen ships in total).
6. Negligence in directing a supply ship from Spain to enter the St. Augustine harbor,
thus after spending time lost in the Florida Straits, it sailed to Havana to engage in trade.
7. The deaths of settlers and soldiers caused by hunger that was directly caused by the
redirection of this specific provisions ship.
8. Not having paid peoples’ salaries for four years.
9. Using his officials and personal servants as trade surrogates and permitting them to sell
goods to settlers and soldiers at an inflated price of 200 percent.
10. Selling more than four thousand ducats-worth of provisions and other goods of His
Majesty meant for the provisions of the people of Florida at inflated prices and ordering
Diego Ruíz, his servant, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, treasurer, and Don Diego de
Velasco, lieutenant, to withdraw this money from coffers in the form of libranzas.122
11. The profit from the goods that have been sold does not seem to have been sent to His
Majesty except for only a small fraction.
12. Not collecting the deposits of his royal officials or provisions keepers and certain
other people that, in effect, caused a great sum of the treasury to be missing for which the
royal officials should be punished.
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13. Selling clothing and provisions sent by order of His Majesty meant for the people of
Florida at other ports in the Indies.

By examining the charges that Castillo leveled against Menéndez, it is evident that the
late-adelantado was heavily involved in an elaborate network of trade. However, the
level of detail provided in the charges is telling of Castillo’s personal knowledge of
Menéndez’s activities. Whether directly or indirectly, it is highly likely that the
investigator himself was an accomplice to the crimes committed. Castillo’s tenure as
royal accountant of the Fleet began in 1568 and ended in 1573, fitting roughly within the
timeframe of the charges outlined. A report is included within the breadth of the
investigation’s papers that concerns Baltasar del Castillo and Florencio de Esquivel,
whom previously held the royal offices of accountant and treasurer of the Indies Fleet,
then under Menéndez’s command. In 1571, while preparing to depart from Cádiz,
Castillo and Esquivel were ordered by the late-adelantado to deliver clothing, munitions,
and provisions to the Indies without proper documentation or permission from the
officials of the Casa de la Contratación.123
It appears that Pedro Menéndez was concerned with building economic ties
between Florida and other Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico port cities. After 1570, situado
funds were used to further solidify these connections, as the subsidy was first collected
from the royal coffers at Nombre de Dios and then from Veracruz’s coffers four years
later.124 These economic connections between Florida and different ports were
predominantly made through the purchasing and selling of royal provisions for the
Florida colony.
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Situado funds and the subsequent importation of supplies required the oversight
of several people. To manage situado funds, the adelantado and royal officials like Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés the Younger, Miguel Moreno, Diego Londoño de Otálora, and don
Diego de Velasco coordinated situado retrievals, facilitated incoming shipments from the
Caribbean purchased with situado funds (predominantly from Cuba), and ultimately
oversaw the incorporation and distribution of supplies in Santa Elena from the local
storehouse. Royal officials also enlisted the help of ship pilots and other merchant
intermediaries operating both in and outside of Florida to secure supply lines.125
Comuño members established monopolies in order to increase profits on situadopurchased provisions and supplies. They were able to do this because they were
proprietors of Menéndez’s Florida Enterprise. By limiting the number and type of
provisions and supplies imported into Santa Elena to be sold to soldiers, as well as
manipulation of supply costs, some profitable margin could be achieved.126 In Santa
Elena: A Brief History of the Colony, 1566-1587, Eugene Lyon discusses the high
probability that Menéndez and others in positions of power converted Florida supplies for
private use.127 Florida supplies, for example, could be exchanged or sold for other goods,
such as wine, olive oil, maize, and livestock. Moreover, since only food or drink could
be loaded onto ships bound for Florida from Spain for six years beginning in 1565,
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excess stores of consumable goods were likely sold or exchanged at different Caribbean
ports for more lucrative merchandise such as clothing, textiles, and weaponry.
Fueling this profiteering system was the officials’ desire to supplement their
salaries. In the case of Florida, supplemental wealth depended largely on the sea.
Through Santa Elena’s port, royal officials exploited shipping, the aforementioned
monopoly system, the control of market prices, and investments made with the situado.
Florida officials had to be clever in order to make their time in the colony profitable. For
example, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés's salary was to be drawn from the riches discovered
in Florida, such as gold, silver and precious stones. These riches, however, did not
necessarily need to be extracted from the land, nor could they have been as Florida was
largely mineral deficient. If royal officials were either related to or personally knew each
other, riches were often collected through direct theft from the local coffers, price
inflation, side ventures, and trading partnerships not reported to the Crown. Before
Castillo’s arrival in Florida, its royal officials were all a part of the comuño, thus easily
allowing Florida’s governing structure to commit theft and orchestrate dubious, trading
deals.
Baltasar del Castillo was aware of the comuño’s economic activities. Thus, a
common theme found throughout Castillo’s investigation is that of the comuño’s fiscal
mismanagement of royal funds. For example, Esteban de Las Alas, who served as the
first lieutenant governor at Santa Elena, found himself under Castillo’s scrutiny. The
charges drawn against Las Alas included selling large quantities of royal provisions in
places like public taverns at inflated prices and for his own profit, not recording or
properly storing goods of the deceased, using business intermediaries to sell situado
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provisions at high prices, and not providing proper necessities for settlers, such as quality
food and clothing.128 Hernando de Miranda, who served as governor of La Florida from
February to June of 1576, was also charged with fiscal irresponsibility. Miranda stood
accused of not recording or properly handling goods of the deceased. Moreover, Miranda
was charged for having accepted a bribe worth over seventy ducados from settler
Rodrigo Menea so that Menea, his wife, and his family could leave the provinces before
their contracts with the adelantado had expired.129 In addition, Castillo charged Miranda
with stealing funds from royal coffers, to the detriment of Santa Elena’s settlers.130
Don Diego de Velasco’s tenure stands out in Castillo’s investigation as he
received the highest number of criminal charges of any official in the Florida residencia.
Velasco was accused of twenty-nine crimes, eleven more than those leveled against the
Adelantado Pedro Menéndez. The period of Velasco’s reign is important to consider as
his tenure at Santa Elena lasted from 1571-1576, the initial years of the situado’s
presence in Florida. Throughout Velasco’s list of charges and the witness testimonies
collected in response to them, the lieutenant seems to have been notoriously crude in both
his demeanor as well as his attitude towards accounting and bookkeeping. For example,
Castillo charged Velasco with not accounting for any of the tribute paid by the
indigenous population. Velasco was also charged with accepting bribes from Spanish
settlers who wished to leave Florida before their contractual agreements expired,
pocketing a few to several hundred ducados each time.131 Velasco, however, denied the
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practice, testifying that he did not allow people to leave because he did not want to
depopulate the town. He instead accused Hernando de Miranda for accepting bribes.132
Santa Elena’s remote location certainly helped its royal officials evade scrutiny.
Far removed from main centers of commerce, illicit trading, as Paul Hoffman asserts,
centered on the exchange of hides and locally derived products like sassafras for
European goods.133 When vessels entered into port, they, by law, needed to have prior
registration and licensing. It was not uncommon for officials to waive these regulations,
largely thanks to the distance separating Santa Elena from other Spanish ports.134 The
relatively small nature of the settlement as compared to other ports in the Indies also
worked in Santa Elena’s favor as it received less traffic. As Bushnell points out in The
King’s Coffer, officials and their trading partners sometimes sailed out to meet trading
vessels in the open sea and conducted transactions there. Goods purchased with situado
funds were undoubtedly used in such dealings. Bushnell explains that foreign vessels
would occasionally display distress flags, sail into ports at either St. Augustine or Santa
Elena, where they sold goods either openly or secretly.135 Therefore, it is not surprising
that officials often kept brief, or incomplete, records of fiscal management, as Castillo
discovered during his inspections.
Juan López, a soldier who served as a guard in Santa Elena’s wooden fort,
provided important insight into the garrison’s economy, one that he suggested was
dominated by comuño members. In his investigation, Castillo asked the soldier:
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Do you know of the abovementioned royal officials (Pedro Menéndez de Avilés
and his lieutenants) or some of them having conducted and trafficked into these
provinces merchandise, provisions, and many other things that had been
personally stored in different accounts by intermediaries in order to sell them, and
if the goods that had been sold on their behalf caused great harm to the people of
the provinces because they were sold goods at excessively high prices?136
In response, López testified that the adelantado did in fact introduce a great quantity of
provisions and other things into the Florida provinces; on one occasion, he brought
approximately eight thousand ducados worth of goods, an amount totaling roughly onethird of the situado. He informed Castillo that once the goods were unloaded from the
ships, they were taken to the fort’s storehouses, where Captain Alonso de Solís and
storekeeper Bartolomé Martín sold them to the public. For soldiers, the prices of goods
were charged against the soldiers’ salaries.137 Twenty questions later, López offered
further insight into Santa Elena’s local pricing and payment arrangements. In response to
question thirty-nine, López confirmed the investigator’s suspicion that there had been
many crimes committed against the royal treasury, including what the soldier saw as
unfair prices imposed on Santa Elena’s residents. López described such goods simply as
“mercaderias,” or merchandise, implying anything from clothing and textiles to
weaponry and other assorted goods.138
Another witness, a ship pilot and soldier named Antonio Martín de Carbajal,
supported López’s claim that the adelantado had brought into the provinces an immense
quantity of clothing. However, before their distribution, Menéndez first sold them to his
lieutenants so that they could then be resold to Santa Elena’s residents. Reselling clothing
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enabled each lieutenant to profit during the distribution of articles like trousers, hats,
shirts, and coats. This shipment of clothing went to Menéndez’s nephew, the one-eyed
treasurer Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, and to the contador, Miguel Moreno, Captain
Alonso de Solís, and finally, to Bartolomé Martín, who at the time was munitions keeper
of the fort’s storehouse. According to the pilot, these men later sold the goods at inflated
prices. Martín also felt compelled to explain that lieutenant don Diego de Velasco was
handing out libranzas, or promissory notes, which Pedro Menéndez The Younger had
acquired in Havana so that they could in turn be given to Santa Elena's residents.139 In the
eyes of Antonío Martín and the recipients of libranzas, promissory notes were seen as
future, not immediate payments.
Castillo revisited the theme of problematic, fiscal stewardship once again in his
list of visita questions. In question forty-one of the inquiry, Castillo asked his witnesses
the following:

If you know about the said royal officials having tried and been found in these
provinces and out of them with the treasury of Your Majesty, having bought in
New Spain and in La Havana and in other parts of the Indies merchandise,
provisions, other goods, and having brought them to these (Florida) provinces and
sold them at excessive prices, using intermediaries?140
In response to this question, Santa Elena resident Juan Pérez de Vargas testified that, “it
is public knowledge and a commonly known fact that the treasurer Pedro Menéndez de
Avilés The Younger charged the situado of the Florida provinces in New Spain and in
Havana for a large quantity of munitions and merchandise. He (Pedro Menéndez) sold
some of these supplies in Havana, using Baltasar de Biera and other persons (as
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intermediaries).” Pérez added that Menéndez The Younger had other accounts in Havana
that he maintained. At one point, the treasurer sent his associate Francisco de Sántaren to
Florida to sell goods on his behalf. Moreover, Vargas claimed to have witnessed the
treasurer at one time send a large quantity of goods to Santa Elena, which were sold to
the soldiers by Martín de Yztuesta, the Alférez Baltasar de Sigüenza, and Antonio Martín.
These men, Pérez testified, sold a variety of merchandise at excessively high prices,
though he does not specify the amount.141
Residents of Santa Elena demanded fair prices in exchange for quality goods,
however they were seldom presented with this agreeable arrangement. Florida’s
governing elite maintained a restrictive economy due to the presence of the situado. For a
number of residents in Santa Elena, jealousy and a sense of entitlement to their fair share
of the situado became all too familiar feelings. The distribution of soldier bonuses—
1,500 ducados worth—was another source of tension. In practice, bonuses were a facet of
the subsidy that only amplified the friction between Santa Elena’s residents and Florida’s
royal officials.
For Santa Elena’s residents, the acquisition and distribution of libranzas, or
promissory notes, was a complex matter that occasionally led to heated disagreements. A
portion of the situado was a special fund of approximately 1,500 ducados that was to be
used to award bonuses. These bonuses were distributed in the form of libranzas and were
intended for soldiers who performed their duties with distinction. Originally a munitions
keeper of Fort San Felipe in Santa Elena, Bartolomé Martín (at the time of his testimony
he served as contador) described this specific bonus pool and its function to Castillo.
Martín shed light on the friction that this special fund caused, stating that each year,
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1,500 ducados (in libranzas) were to be dispersed to deserving individuals of the 150
officials and soldiers who provided services to the Crown. There were seventeen officials
and soldiers that received these extra benefits, including the treasurer Pedro Menéndez
The Younger, Alférez Miguel Moreno, Sergeant Pedro Luís, Francisco Criado, Diego
Enriquez, Martín Hernandez, and Juan Méndez, to name a few. Martín then provided a
breakdown of how much each recipient received and, not surprisingly, Menéndez the
Younger was awarded a staggering six hundred ducados, approximately six times as
much as a soldier’s annual salary. The amounts taper down to a mere several dozen
reales for the common foot soldier, thus slightly augmenting their annual salary of 115
ducados.142 Therefore, it is clear how the distribution of bonuses could increase local
tensions. The discretion of an official as to who was worthy of a bonus versus who was
not served as a source of potential conflict.
Martín was not the only soldier who complained about the bonuses. Alonso del
Olmos voiced his grievances with how the funds were allocated. The disgruntled settler
complained how he had never seen Iñigo Ruíz, a ship pilot, trade intermediary, and bonus
recipient, ever serve in the guard company at Santa Elena. Velasco did not reward Iñigo
for serving in the guard company, however, and instead rewarded Ruíz for his shipping
services between Florida’s ports and those of the Caribbean. 143 Olmos added that don
Diego de Velasco was known for distributing funds to persons not in the service to the
Crown. Rodrigo de Bustos was another beneficiary of situado bonuses whom Olmos felt
was not worthy of the additional funds. Understandably so, seeing as he was the officially

142

Ibid, fols. 464v-66v; Bushnell, The King’s Coffers, 39.
Velasco insisted that Iñigo Ruiz received 500 bonus ducados because he was a very good soldier,
especially for having retrieved the situado from Tierra Firme, which took an entire year to execute. See
AGI Escribania 154A, fols. 909r-v.
143

78
appointed scribe for Santa Elena and not a soldier on the garrison’s muster roll. Another
solider testified that Rodrigo be Bustos only received a bonus because of his service in
shipping and bringing extra merchandise to be sold in Santa Elena—not for exceptional
service in defending the settlement, as the bonus requirements outlined.
It was not uncommon for soldiers to receive insignificant bonuses. To make
matters worse, soldiers witnessed comuño members award each other and/or their
merchant intermediaries with hundreds of extra ducados. Soldier Juan López testified that
in September 1575, Governor Velasco issued bonuses to a number of undeserving
individuals, all of whom were either cooperative under his rule or were complicit in his
trading ventures. As mentioned, this included comuño members like Pedro Menéndez de
Avilés the Younger. Bartolomé Flores, an Indian servant of Velasco, also received
additional funds that López considered unwarranted.144 López continued his accusations
of unworthy persons, stating that Alonso del Olmos’s sons, soldiers included on the
payroll, were in reality too young to have been effective in the guard company—an
interesting observation, considering that the senior Olmos was so vocal about his
dissatisfaction with the bonus distributions.145 Perhaps his sons did not receive as much
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as he thought their services merited, especially in light of the fact that the senior Olmos
almost lost one of his sons during a Jesuit mission effort to the Indian territory of Jacán in
September of 1570.146 For the senior Olmos, the boy’s survival during the hostile mission
undoubtedly merited reward and praise for both the survivor and the survivor’s family.
Lack of praise, however, probably helped influence Olmos’s negative point of view and
feelings towards the comuño. There were other factors, however, that also led to Olmos’s
dissatisfaction with the local power structure.
Alonso del Olmos was a popular figure in the settlement. He was considered a
“first settler” in Santa Elena—a title indicative of both Olmos and his family’s initial
colonization efforts in Santa Elena. Accompanying the title of “first settler” carried a high
degree of honor and respect that Olmos and his family rightfully merited in their
colonization services to the Crown. The Olmos family’s economic activities at Santa
Elena included farming, loaning money, running a tailor shop, artisan work, and
managing an inn and tavern.147 Olmos, along with Francisco Ruíz, were heads of the
settler faction and represented the interests of individuals who were not included on the
royal payroll. In time, settlers like Olmos and Ruíz hoped to grow wealthy as Florida
colonists, as their livelihoods depended largely upon their agricultural enterprises.
Proving their dissatisfaction of their experience at Santa Elena, however, is the fact that
their names appear in the opening letter’s list of those who wished to depart from the
settlement to seek opportunities elsewhere.
Though he was not a soldier, Olmos undoubtedly depended upon his sons’
salaries to acquire goods that aided his ventures. With the uneven distribution of funds

146
147

Paar, “To Settle is to Conquer,” 80-1.
Ibid.

80
like soldier bonuses, though, it is easy to see how Olmos was affected by the decisions of
men like don Diego de Velasco, who were directly responsible for how bonuses and
provisions were distributed in Santa Elena. Therefore, it is not surprising that tension
between Velasco and the senior Olmos transformed into verbal, personal assaults on each
other’s honor and families.148 For a small settlement like Santa Elena, disputes over
honor and public shaming were acutely embarrassing. Castillo made a point to
incorporate the quarrels between Velasco and Olmos into the pages of the investigation
for they revealed, in particularly sharp relief, the divide between comuño members and
settlers.
As with all residencias, part of Castillo’s investigation permitted officials to
defend their actions and decisions during their tenures. In defense of the fiscal
mismanagement charges against him, don Diego de Velasco insisted that goods
distributed to settlers and soldiers were marked at fair prices and that fraud was never a
reality during his tenure as Santa Elena’s governor. As for those who claimed to have not
been paid, he argued that such persons were lying and, in reality, each person scheduled
to receive payments was given their allotted amount of goods, in the presence of a scribe
and other witnesses. Each person was given what was owed, which, as Velasco
highlighted, took the form of costly rations such as meat, bread, wine, oils, and
clothing.149 In response to the charge leveled against Velasco concerning his commission
of Rodrigo de Bustos, royal scribe for Florida, and his “servant” Iñigo Ruiz to bring
outside goods into the Florida provinces worth approximately six thousand ducados,
Velasco claimed that he was without fault. The former governor testified that, “had I not
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done this, the people of these provinces would have starved.” To the baffled Velasco, this
charge was unwarranted, as this commission was necessary for Florida’s very survival. 150
In an effort to spare himself from royal punishment, Velasco vehemently denied every
charge brought against him.
The interim-governor exaggerated his claims. There had not been catastrophic
levels of hunger during Velasco’s tenure as governor of Santa Elena, seeing as imported
food items and locally produced crop yields were regularly consumed in the
settlement.151 Though it was tiny, Santa Elena did have an export market for consumables
like maize and even suckling pigs.152 These exports were not significant enough,
however, to be the sole source of income for the settlement—further indication of Santa
Elena’s reliance on the situado to supplement its local market.
By studying Velasco’s financial pursuits, the commercial nature of Santa Elena is
further exposed. For example, Velasco and Rodrigo de Bustos were known to have
participated in a joint-trading venture. They were not the only officials to have done so,
either.153 On one occasion, royal officials Hernando de Miranda and Pedro Menéndez
The Younger acquired a ship with situado funds and stocked it with a variety of
provisions purchased with situado funds. The goods were then sold to residents of Santa
Elena that, according to several witnesses, included exorbitant price hikes. The two
associates then charged the Crown for freight costs for transporting the supplies to
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Florida.154 Diego de Velasco too shared a partnership with Pedro Menéndez The
Younger. Their mutual desire for increased profits materialized into a joint venture where
the two men used situado funds to invest in goods that were later sold to the soldiers and
settlers in Florida, in some cases at a two hundred percent markup.155
Price inflations undoubtedly placed fiscal strain upon the residents of Santa Elena,
as they were forced to pay higher prices for both basic and luxury goods. 156 This included
items such as clothing and weaponry. For those who filled a soldier plaza, the price of
these goods would have been charged against their salary. This purchasing arrangement
was not an uncommon practice and in fact was the conclusive agreement drawn between
Menéndez and soldiers during Florida’s conquest. As prices for basic goods increased
during the 1570s, however, both shipping costs and profitable surcharges attached to
provisions indebted residents to the treasury and thus to royal officials.157 Debt, however,
was not necessarily objected to, so long as people received both necessary and desired
provisions and were equally satisfied with the condition of those supplies. Debts were
also a way to keep those collecting soldier wages anchored in Santa Elena. The negative
side of this arrangement, however, was that spending power for residents was gradually
weakened as royal provisions sold by the comuño increased in price in order for their
Florida venture to be profitable.158
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Baltasar del Castillo’s investigation into the tenures of Florida’s governing elite
offers a glimpse into the impact of the situado on the settlement of Santa Elena. Castillo’s
residencia, predominantly focused on the fiscal stewardship of the settlement, suggests
that the situado was seen as an opportunity for financial gain for those who were
members of or were associated with the comuño. These men, after all, were in charge of
the subsidy’s collection and its local distribution. For Florida’s royal officials, the situado
acted as an allowance that for roughly five years went unchecked—that is, until Castillo’s
arrival in Florida in 1576.159
Officials’ depositions and witness testimonies reveal both the positive and
negative effects of the situado on the local and regional economy, as well as its ability to
cause social tension within the settlement. Through the situado, Santa Elena became
linked to a number of port cities, including Veracruz, Havana, Campeche, Nombre de
Dios, and Cartagena de Indias, all of which provided goods to the distant settlement. The
dependency that residents and officials demonstrated towards the situado, in addition to
its unequal distribution, however, sparked local conflicts that, over a few short years,
proved destabilizing to colonial efforts in Florida.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion

The Crown was eager to learn how its specie was used in Florida. Despite
receiving financial aid, the struggles of Florida seemingly continued. The Crown
deliberated as to who would make the most effective investigator for the type of
information they wished to receive; in this case, a detailed rendering of Santa Elena’s
fiscal operations. An investigator’s prior knowledge of, experiences with, and familiarity
to the official(s) under inspection was crucial to consider. With a sentenced, ex-armada
accountant at their disposal, the Crown called upon Castillo to perform Florida’s
residencia.
In regards to how Castillo approached the residencia and ultimately what he
uncovered, Jeanette Thurber Connor states that, “The visitador [Castillo] seems to have
been harsh in his judgments, but undoubtedly he uncovered much that was unsavory,
especially in matters pertaining to the royal exchequer.”160 Though having published her
manuscript almost one hundred years ago, Thurber was, and still is, absolutely correct. It
was Castillo’s job to be critical of each royal official’s tenure. Given Castillo’s previous
history with the armada as well as shipping and handling of royal provisions under the
adelantado’s direction, the visitador was able to uncover how the situado affected the
market of Santa Elena, the satisfaction of its residents, and, most significantly, the
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effectiveness of the Crown’s 1565 conquest contract with Menéndez to expand the
Florida Enterprise.
Through Castillo’s investigatory efforts, the Crown recognized and admitted to
two, discernable facts. Closer supervision of Florida’s treasury practices and subsidy
transactions were necessary if the Crown no longer wished to be cheated out of funds.
For approximately ten years, royal officials at Santa Elena exploited almost every
economic opportunity that they could get their hands on. Their actions are not surprising,
seeing as the Crown permitted them to act as private entrepreneurs in the conquest and
colonization of the Florida colony. With the sanctioning of the situado, however, their
profitable ambitions centered in on a new and predominantly guaranteed source of
income. By the time Castillo arrived in Florida, comuño members had, for five years,
systematically exploited the situado in order to better their financial standing. The actions
of the comuño caused considerable unrest in the colony. Soldiers and colonists expressed
their dissatisfaction with the situado’s use, for they, and especially the soldiers, were
dependent on the situado for their provisioning and livelihood. This is not to say that they
starved, as Santa Elena’s farmers and neighboring indigenous populations saw to the
colony’s sustenance. Instead, what angered persons on the military’s payroll was the
unequal distribution of the situado’s benefits. Witnessing royal officials handsomely
profit off of a subsidy that was intended for them undoubtedly soured their experiences in
Santa Elena.
The comuño’s actions were a byproduct of Pedro Menéndez’s 1565 Florida
enterprise. Menéndez and the comuño held high expectations for Florida. The contract
Menéndez signed with King Philip II to conquer, colonize, and pacify Florida granted
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extraordinary incentives to the family. They stood to gain royal titles held in perpetuity,
slaves licenses free of duties, shipping exemptions, land, and a greater share on mineral
resources should any be found. Substantial risk was involved in Menéndez’s endeavor, so
the Crown had to make its offer as attractive as possible. Fifty years of failed,
colonization attempts ending in death and/or financial ruin on Florida’s shores were a
powerful deterrent. Menéndez, in agreement with comuño members and other creditors,
however, took the risk.
Heightening the urgency of Menéndez’s operations was the landed presence of a
French colony at Fort Caroline. On top of the gracious incentives that Philip II granted
the adelantado, the Crown agreed to advance an additional 15,000 ducados to Menéndez
to hasten the outfitting of his ships and his forces. Ousting the French was crucial, as was
discouragement of future imperial rivals who wished to challenge Spain’s hegemony over
Florida. Menéndez needed to arrive and plant colonies as soon as possible, for the
strategic as well as symbolic importance of Florida required it.
For the resources that they poured into the undertaking, as well as the dangers
they faced, Menéndez and the comuño expected to not only recuperate their losses, but
also to reap tremendous profits. If Menéndez could exploit every incentive the Crown
offered him in his contract, he stood to become one of the richest and most powerful
royal subjects in the Spanish Empire. Of course, this success went beyond the confines of
the adelantado. His successes in Florida would benefit his family both immediately and
in perpetuity and would have enabled the Spanish Crown to extend its hegemony into the
expansive North American interior.
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Unfortunately, Florida’s assumed riches remained out of reach. For the most part,
reality was cruel towards the vision of the enterprise. Entradas, or exploratory missions,
attempted to discover what lay hidden beyond Florida’s shores, yet these missions
usually ended in disappointment and/or death. Large, concentrated settlements of Native
Americans as encountered in New Spain (Mexico) were notably absent from the region.
If there were extensive veins of gold and silver, neither Spanish colonists nor royal
officials ever saw them.
Frustrated over the lack of easily exploitable, economic opportunities in Florida,
Menéndez informed the Crown that the enterprise needed assistance. Specifically,
Menéndez petitioned the Crown to grant Florida its own situado to support its military
presence. For Menéndez, provisioning three hundred soldiers was a costly endeavor. The
initial five years of Florida’s colonization did not live up to the expectations of either the
adelantado or the comuño. As a result, their entrepreneurial skills were put to the test.
With the lack of incentives from the region’s interior, royal officials at Santa Elena
elected to remain on the coast, close to the economic opportunities provided by the
settlement’s deepwater port. For the comuño, circumstances dictated that private
entrepreneurship no longer meant expansion of the Spanish Empire into North
America—instead, their efforts were directed toward the sea. The sanctioning of
Florida’s royal subsidy crystallized their decision.
The situado was a turning point for Florida. Its presence was felt almost
immediately in both the settlements of Florida and the wider Caribbean. Crown funding
for rations and trade goods helped supply the Florida settlements, but it also supported
the economies of other ports where royal officials purchased commodities and traded
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with situado funds. Royal officials’ dubious management of the situado, however, was
not what the Crown envisioned, nor was it sanctioned to give insular, preferential
treatment to Menéndez, the comuño, and their associates. As the 1570s progressed, royal
officials and soldiers still could not adequately secure, defend, or expand the limits of
Florida’s frontier, despite being granted assistance from the Crown.
The way that royal officials’ chose to implement situado funds held implications
for Santa Elena and the satisfaction of its residents. When Baltasar del Castillo began his
inspection of Florida, he found evidence that Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and the comuño
supplied the vulnerable, Florida settlements with necessities as well as granted bonuses to
persons they deemed as worthy receivers. In other words, the comuño used the situado
just how the Crown ordered. The issue was, however, the quantity and regularity of
shipments, the content of shipments, and the price that goods were set at for
consumption. Additionally, who received bonuses and why served as a significant source
of discord for Santa Elena’s residents. In particular, physically demonstrating that the
situado was benefitting soldiers, for example, was crucial for officials to maintain. If
adequate rations, trade goods, and other valuables did not find their way into the colony,
or they did but were marked at increasingly high prices, the effectiveness of the royal
subsidy then became suspect, as did persons who were in charge of the situado’s
collection and distribution.
In response to the sanctioning of Florida’s situado, royal officials, soldiers, and
colonists, living and operating both in Florida and outside of the colony, all experienced
varying levels of benefit and/or dissatisfaction towards the subsidy’s management. In
action, the funds were never enough to promote the profitable ambitions of Florida’s
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governing elite, to adequately provision the soldiery, and to diversify Florida’s market at
a reasonable cost for persons on the military payroll. Though the funds were set aside by
the Crown to support Florida’s military presence, it became clear that not every piece of
specie was put towards the cause. If there is one, concrete truth that can be drawn from
Castillo’s investigation, it is that Santa Elena’s financial affairs caused a considerable
amount of discord and, that under the direction of Menéndez and the comuño, the Spanish
Empire would never expand into the North American interior.
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